Archive for the Category Neoliberalism

 
 

How many more populist “victories” can we survive?

Here’s Salon on the Greece government’s “victory” last February:

One week after Greece’s leftist government reached a new debt deal with its creditors, Paul Krugman argues in his New York Times column today that left-wing criticism of the deal is misguided, obscuring larger victories secured by Greek negotiators.

And here’s Paul Krugman in 2012 on Argentina’s “remarkable success.”

Matt Yglesias, who just spent time in Argentina, writes about the lessons of that country’s recovery following its exit from the one-peso-one-dollar “convertibility law”. As he says, it’s a remarkable success story, one that arguably holds lessons for the euro zone.

I’d just add something else: press coverage of Argentina is another one of those examples of how conventional wisdom can apparently make it impossible to get basic facts right. We keep getting stories about Ireland’s recovery when there is, in fact, no recovery “” but there should be, darn it, because they’ve done the “right” thing, so that’s what we’ll report.

And conversely, articles about Argentina are almost always very negative in tone “” they’re irresponsible, they’re renationalizing some industries, they talk populist, so they must be going very badly.

In fairness, they did have a very strong cyclical rebound after easing monetary policy (an issue on which I agree with Krugman.)  Where I disagree is his tendency to sort of wave away supply-side concerns—which are what matters in the long run.  It looks like the long run has arrived, as the Argentine economy has sputtered over the three years since he wrote this post, and 2015 will be downright ugly.

From the same post, Krugman has good things to say about Brazil’s slightly more moderate, but still hopelessly statist policy regime:

Just to be clear, I think Brazil is going pretty well, and has had good leadership. But why exactly is Brazil an impressive “BRIC” while Argentina is always disparaged? Actually, we know why “” but it doesn’t speak well for the state of economics reporting.

Why was Argentina disparaged?  Perhaps because some of us don’t have a “in the long run we are all dead” Keynesian obsession with the demand-side.  We saw problems down the road. BTW, the Argentine president who created the disaster died in 2010, leaving his wife to inherit the mess “in the long run.” Brazil has also done very poorly in the three years since Krugman praised its (incompetent) leadership, and the forecasts reported in the next link call the outlook for Brazil’s economy in 2015 “grim.”  Nor will boosting AD perform miracles, Brazil and Argentina already have lots of inflation.

Here’s the outlook for the key economies in Latin America next year:

Many Latin American economies will continue to face increasing growth divergence this year, which is neatly defined by the two oceans that envelop the region. The Atlantic-facing economies of Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela””the largest members of the Mercosur bloc””will contract 0.2%, 0.9%, 5.5%, respectively, according to LatinFocus Consensus Forecasts panelists. On the other side of the continent, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru””which make up the Pacific Alliance””will expand 2.9%, 3.4%, 2.9% and 3.5%, respectively.

Let’s see, I’m trying to remember which side had the more statist policy regimes, the Atlantic or the Pacific bloc?  The next paragraph answers the question:

This division has little to do with the western countries’ orientation toward a more dynamic Asia and the eastern countries’ exposure to the European economies, which are still weak. In fact, the growth divergence is mainly the result of the substantial differences in each country’s economic policy during a decade-long economic boom, which was fuelled by high commodities prices and strong inflows of foreign direct investment. Throughout the boom years, Atlantic countries spent more and saved less, while the Pacific-facing countries invested more. Moreover, many governments in the Atlantic-facing countries implemented more interventionist economic policies, which put a dent in businesses’ profits and discouraged investment. Conversely, countries bordering the Pacific undertook agendas of economic reforms, which investors welcomed.

But that doesn’t make any sense. How could the Pacific countries be doing better, when they relied more on the brain dead supply-side approach of the GOP?  Of course Krugman told us that Chile’s supposed free market success is just “Fantasies of the Chicago Boys.

But there’s another point: the economics of Chile under Pinochet are a lot more ambiguous than legend has it. The way the story is told now, the free-market guys moved in, liberalized, and then there was a boom.

Actually, as you can see from the chart above, what happened was this: Chile had a huge economic crisis in the early 70s, which was, yes, partly due to Allende and the accompanying turmoil. Then the country experienced a recovery driven in large part by massive capital inflows, which mostly consisted of making up the lost ground. Then there was a huge crisis again in the early 1980s “” part of the broader Latin debt crisis, but Chile was hit much worse than other major players. It wasn’t until the late 1980s, by which time the hard-line free-market policies had been considerably softened, that Chile finally moved definitively ahead of where it had been in the early 70s.

There’s no question the Chicago Boys screwed up in the early 1980s, by ignoring Milton Friedman’s (and Paul Krugman’s) advice to float your currency.  But what about that supposed “softening” of free market policies?  Here’s the Fraser Institute rankings of economic freedom in Chile (index number out of 10, and then global ranking), since the Chicago-style reforms began in 1975:

1975:    3.60  (71)

1980:   5.38  (48)

1990:    6.78  (27)

2000:   7.41  (33)

2010:   7.94   (7)

If there are “fantasies,” it’s the idea that Chile became less market-oriented after the late 1970s.

Perhaps Brazil could try some Paul Romerstyle charter cities on its poverty-stricken northeast coast.  You know, the kind of free trade zone that was adopted by another country advised by Friedman at about the same time he advised the brutal Pinochet regime. This regime was far more brutal, and yet oddly Friedman got no criticism from the left for his advice, perhaps because the left was embarrassed by the fact that so many of their famous intellectuals had praised the regime over the previous decades, as they killed tens of millions of people.  Have you guessed which one?  Hint, it’s right after Chile in alphabetical order.  And the main street in its biggest free trade zone went from looking like this in 1981:

Screen Shot 2015-04-29 at 6.21.04 PM

To this in 2013:

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Brazil might want to contact Mr. Romer.

NGDP research bleg

There are basically three general arguments for NGDP targeting:

1.  It will reduce labor market instability.

2.  It will reduce credit market instability.

3.  It will lead to more pro-market public policies.

I am looking for links to previous empirical research in any of these three areas, but especially the last two.  The first is obviously important, perhaps the most important argument, but it’s also been researched fairly extensively.

Here I’ll sketch out what interests me about the second and third topic:

Financial instability:  It seems like financial crises are often associated with declines in NGDP.  Think about the US and Europe in 1931, Argentina in 2001, the US and Europe in the period after mid-2008.  But that’s just casual empiricism.  I’d like to see rigorous academic studies that look at many different financial crises.  How often are they associated with falling NGDP?  Does this correlation only show up in certain countries?  What about a slowdown in NGDP growth where it still remains positive?  (For instance, did the slowdown in NGDP growth during the 1980s and early 1990s contribute to the S&L crisis?)

Statist policies:  It seems like free market policies do fairly well when NGDP growth is fairly stable (1922-29, 1953-64, 1985-2007) and statist policies do better when NGDP growth is unstable (1913-21, 1930-52, 1965-81, 2008-10).  Obviously there are lots of issues here.  In the case of WWI and WWII, you may have reverse causality—government spending causes the NGDP instability.  But there’s also lots of plausible examples going the other way—the Great Depression leading to the NIRA, the Great Inflation leading to wage and price controls, the Great Recession leading to bailouts, etc.)

It would also be interesting to look at this question from an international perspective.  Out of curiosity, I took a look at the Heritage Economic Freedom scores for the US and Australia, before and after the crisis:

Country    Score(rank)2007     2015

Australia           82.7 (3)           81.4 (4)

USA                  82.0 (4)          76.2 (12)

Australia had much less NGDP instability, at least in a “level targeting” sense (this may not be easy to quantify.)  Is that why the economic freedom score for the US slipped much more than for Australia?  Perhaps, but Australia does slide behind New Zealand, which moved up to number 3, and which nonetheless had a worse recession than Australia.  Another problem is that smaller economies (and commodity exporters) “naturally” have a more unstable NGDP, indeed this is probably desirable.  So you’d need to control for a number of factors.

I seem to recall that the average Heritage Economic Freedom score was rising during the Great Moderation, and began falling after somewhere around 2008.  Is that correct?  I also wonder whether it depends on which regime (statist or market-oriented) is viewed as the plausible alternative.  In the US in 1930 the alternative was statism.  Today in Greece the alternative may be market-friendly policies.  That underlies the conservative fear that NGDP targeting might allow Greece to avoid the needed “tough choices.”

In any case, these are obvious three big issues that need looking at.  I’d guess there’s already some research on these topics, but mostly for labor market instability.  Again, I’d greatly appreciate links to any research on how NGDP instability is correlated with problems like unemployment, financial crises, and statist policies.

Update:  E. Harding sent me a graph showing the average Heritage ranking.  It rose to a peak at 60.2 in 2008, then fell to a trough of 59.4 in 2010, then rose again to an even higher peak of 60.4 in 2015.  Thus the US decline is not typical.

Argentina: Are conservatives wrong about markets or money?

Argentina offers an interesting lesson in the relative importance of monetary policy and structural reforms.  During the period from 1991-97 it grew very rapidly with neoliberal reforms.  Then in 1998-2001 the economy experienced deflation.  After 2002 a new left wing government came in and adopted a very inflationary monetary policy.  It also moved away from neoliberalism, adopting all sorts of statist economic policies.

So was real growth higher in the 1998-2001 period or the period since 2002?

It’s not even close.  The period from 1998-2001 was a disaster, one of the worst depressions of modern times.  And since 2002 the economy has seen fast growth, which led to the current government recently winning a landslide election victory.  

Conservatives in America have recently adopted the position that monetary stimulus doesn’t help, even when NGDP has fallen dramatically below trend.  They also believe in pro-market policies and oppose statism (unless they are actually in government of course.)  So it seems to me that Argentina discredits conservatism.  You have a country that got much higher growth from shifting from a deflationary monetary policy to an inflationary monetary policy.  And all this despite the adoption of horrible statist policies.

So are conservatives wrong about markets, or money?

The answer is simple.  They are right about markets and wrong about money.  Argentina shows just how important it is to get monetary policy right.  If you don’t, even the most misguided statist policies can look far better than anything the more pro-market party has to offer.

Even today Argentina is a “failed” economy by any reasonable standard.  It’s no longer one of the richest countries on Earth, as it was 100 years ago.  But it’s also much less “failed” than 10 years ago, an inconvenient truth for all the RBC-types who deny the importance of nominal shocks.

PS.  Nothing in this post should be construed as praising recent Argentine policies.  The monetary policy has been too expansionary, leading to high inflation.  The government has covered up the inflation.   I get all that.  But the depression of 1998-2001 was far worse.  Something the Argentine voters clearly understand.

Join the club

In late 2008 it was frustrating to hear all the triumphal statements from leftists about the failure of neoliberalism, the failure or of market fundamentalism, the failure of deregulation.  Of course the real problem was the tight money policy of the Fed, which caused NGDP to fall rapidly.

Now the progressives are getting a taste of their own medicine.  Just as the 2008 crash did look (at first glance) like a failure of capitalism, the 2011 euro collapse looks (at first glance) like a failure of the European big government welfare state model.  Here’s Paul Krugman fighting a losing battle:

What a tragedy. A rich, productive continent, which has produced arguably the most decent societies in human history, is tearing itself apart because its elite insisted on embarking on a dubious monetary project, and now can’t bring itself to take the steps necessary to give that project a chance of working.

He may be right about the virtues of Europe.  But take it from me, trying to sell that argument at a time like this is like trying to hold back the tide.

In reality, the US banking model was flawed.  It made no sense to deregulate the asset side of bank balance sheets as we were backstopping the liability side.  And in reality, the Greek and Italian and Irish governments made a lot of poor choices.  But capitalism works pretty well, as does the Northern European welfare state.  In both cases tight money made some very real problems seem much worse than they actually were.

The majority view will always be the common sense view.  When that view is wrong, there’s not much you can do except keep plugging away, and hopefully convince historians to re-write the history books a couple decades later (as Friedman and Schwartz overturned the original view of the Great Depression)  That original view was that the Great Depression represented a failure of capitalism.  Now it’s understood to be a failure of monetary policy.

Plus ca change . . .

What do the French really believe about capitalism?

The French elite (both left and right wing) are famous for disparaging the savage inequalities of Anglo-Saxon laissez-faire capitalism.  (BTW, I’ve never been clear why they include Britain in that category.  If France has socialized medicine then Britain has communist medicine.  And government spending is currently 50% of GDP in Britain.)

The Economist magazine often points out that the French are actually much more pragmatic then their rhetoric suggests, and that they have come to terms with markets.  It seems to me that the current economic crisis in the PIGS provides a good test of this proposition.  So what have the French been telling their southern neighbors to do, in order to rescue their economies?

1.  Privatize, privatize, privatize.

2.  Deregulate market access.

3.  Make it much easier for firms to hire and fire workers.

4.  Raise the retirement age to 67.

5.  Shrink their governments, which are already smaller than the French government as a share of GDP.

In other words, the French think a troubled economy can best “reform” by becoming more like the United States.

I’ve always thought that the French have a fine model–but it only seems to work in France.