A win for Trump and a loss for Trumpism

As time goes by, it becomes increasingly obvious that global populism has no coherent governing philosophy. Or if it does, it has no serious intention to implement those policies.

The most recent Economist has a number of articles discussing recent politics in Britain and France, which are both wracked by populist turmoil. It’s now clear that the Brexit hardliners have no governing vision for the UK, and that their ideology is essentially nihilistic. The same is true of the yellow jacket protesters in France. As with many other populist movements throughout the world, the yellow jackets began with a set of economic grievances and soon morphed into a crude nativist movement, full of racism and anti-Semitism.

Trump’s only major policy successes have been in adopting the traditional “Mitt Romney” GOP agenda, cutting taxes for big corporations, easing environmental regs, and nominating conservative judges. According to the FT, the rumored China trade deal is likely to continue that trend:

Yet there is scant evidence that Beijing has offered to make a big change in course, or to provide a mechanism to assure Washington that it will stick by any commitments. . . .

For Mr Trump, there is a clear desire to reassure markets and extend the momentum in the US economy ahead of his re-election bid in 2020. He wants to fulfil a key campaign promise to reset trade relations with China, especially as the prospects for other commitments, such as building a wall on the Mexican border, have faded.

The risk for the president is a backlash from China hawks both on the left and the right of the political spectrum, who are already grumbling that Mr Trump will settle for a weak deal. To them, he squandered much of his leverage by delaying the tariff increase.

“Lighthizer’s ability to get binding MoUs on the key non-trade barrier issues such as forced technology transfers can only occur if you execute the 1 March tariffs — otherwise the pressure comes off the Chinese,” Steve Bannon, Mr Trump’s former senior adviser, said in an email on Saturday.

China’s stock market was up 5.6% today. Good.

Obviously this rumored agreement won’t address the underlying economic issues that concern protectionists like Navarro and Bannon. It won’t reduce our trade deficit and it won’t bring manufacturing jobs back to America. But this is one of those rare occasions where I side with Trump, and I also believe this will be good for him politically. Most of his base doesn’t care about any actual policy changes, they are just interested in seeing him look like a leader who “owns the libs”. They don’t want to see empty shelves when they shop at Walmart. And a stock market crash would look bad to Trump’s upper middle class white supporters.

There are much worse things than a demagogue being a “market politician”, guided by stock market sentiment like an ox with a nose ring being pulling along by a farmer. Imagine if he were actually a 1930s-style populist, implementing actual populist policies.

Meanwhile, Trump’s attempt to close the southern border has failed, at least according to the metric used by the Trumpistas to claim success in early 2017. This NYT article provides numerous quotes of Trump gloating over the drop in detentions at the border, which occurred during the first half of 2017 (grey line):

Trump succeeded before he failed

By fiscal year 2018, things were back to normal according to this very same data source, and detentions are now well above the levels of previous years (red line).

As with Trump’s failure to achieve the Navarro/Bannon trade agenda, and as with his failure to get a big federal infrastructure program, this border failure is actually good news. We need more illegal workers to “Make America Great Again”. After all, poor Americans on welfare have zero interest in picking vegetables all day in the hot sun, unless you raised their wage so high that American consumers switched to imported vegetables and we started growing wheat in California. Illegal Mexican immigrants in construction will make new Texas homes more affordable for blue collar workers moving from Buffalo, fleeing New York state’s nightmarish fiscal policies and cold weather.

The Dems were willing to give Trump the wall in exchange for a DACA agreement, something overwhelmingly supported by his base. But ultimately his base cares more about Trump continuing to fight the elites, so he opted to forego the wall. Trump cares more about having the “fighting for the wall” issue than he does about stopping the flow of illegals.

I still think that Trump’s unique mixture of stupidity, cruelty, and dishonesty makes him the worst president in US history. But it would be even worse if he took seriously the demagogic populist agenda that he ran on. Instead, his primary goal seems to be propping up the stock market. We’ll see how the Dems react to that reality.

We live in the global era of populism, but actual populist policies are hard to find, outside of Venezuela.

PS. Next up is an entirely symbolic meeting with Trump’s love interest in North Korea. More “leadership” for his base.

PPS. For you alt-rightists depressed by all of this, consider that the new populist socialism on the left is every bit as empty of actual policy content as is Trumpism. No, America’s not about to become socialist, and, “You can keep your private health care plan.” I promise.

🙂

The new model is . . . capitalism

We keep reading pundits opine that neoliberalism is passé, and that we need a new model for the 21st century. So what is the new model being adopted in Ethiopia? Here’s the FT:

Ethiopia aims to complete a multibillion-dollar privatisation of its telecoms sector by the end of this year, followed by a sell-off of stakes in state energy, shipping and sugar companies, according to the new prime minister Abiy Ahmed.

The government also plans to launch a domestic stock exchange in 2020, part of a gradual but decisive shift towards economic liberalisation in the fast-growing east African country of 105m people.

“My economic model is capitalism,” Mr Abiy said in an interview with the Financial Times, conducted in his refurbished headquarters in Addis Ababa. “If you give me $100bn now, I can’t use it. There is not only money, there is talent and experience. That’s why we need the private sector.”

Don’t worry socialists, Marx assured us that capitalism is just an unfortunate phase that Ethiopia must pass through before they achieve the glories of North Korea, Cuba and Venezuela.

PS: Off topic, I have a new piece in The Hill defending my Fed accountability and transparency proposal.

What should be on the agenda in Chicago?

The Fed plans to hold a conference in Chicago during June, with the goal of developing improved tools, targets and strategies. Obviously the major issue will be how to deal with the zero bound, which is expected to reoccur during the next recession. In my view the second goal should be to develop procedures that avoid the mistakes made during 2008 (before the zero bound was hit), which were acknowledged in Bernanke’s memoir.

One key lesson from the Great Recession is that when rates are zero it’s very difficult to be too expansionary. Almost everywhere in the world, at all times in history, central banks at the zero bound adopt policies that in retrospect look too contractionary. Contemporaneous fears of inflation prove groundless. So that’s one important lesson.

Next recession, the Fed needs to immediately stop paying IOR and be far more aggressive with QE than last time. We know that inflation isn’t the real problem at the zero bound. A recent Yahoo article suggests that bond yield pegging is another option being considered:

Fed officials would also reassess how well their policy toolkit worked in combating the deep recession that followed the financial crisis of 2008-09, and consider what additional tools might be added to prepare for the next downturn. He mentioned a crisis-time policy implemented by the Bank of Japan, which would seek to establish a temporary ceiling for Treasury debt yields at longer maturities, as a tool that might be considered.

That’s a reasonable option, but it’s not enough by itself. Indeed, doing more concrete steps at ultra-low interest rates is not enough, as ultra-low interest rates represent a sort of prediction of policy failure, a prediction that NGDP will grow too slowly to achieve the Fed’s dual mandate. The goal should be to prevent the zero bound from occurring in the first place, not just to deal with it appropriately. Once you are there, you have already (accidentally) adopted an inadequate policy.

One option for avoiding the zero bound it to raise the inflation target, but the Fed has ruled that out:

In reviewing its fundamental strategies, Clarida made clear the Fed wouldn’t change its target for inflation from the current 2 percent level. Policy makers would consider, however, whether the central bank should introduce a strategy that seeks to make up for periods of below-target inflation with periods of above-target price rises.

Level targeting is the sort of regime that makes it less likely you’ll hit the zero bound, but the devil is in the details. A promise to do whatever it takes to get back to the price level trend line in 10 years is far less effective than a promise to get back there in 4 years. Partly because the quicker rebound is more expansionary, and partly because it’s more credible that the Fed chair would still be around in 4 years.

Although I’d prefer 4% NGDPLT with no 2% inflation target, it is possible to combine NGDPLT with a flexible 2% inflation target, which puts weight on both inflation and employment. You simply set the NGDP target equal to 2% plus the Fed’s estimate of trend RGDP growth, and adjust the growth estimate periodically to reflect new estimates of trend RGDP growth. That’s not as good as a simple NGDP level targeting (inflation actually doesn’t matter), but it still gets you 95% of the benefits of NGDPLT and it’s also consistent with the Fed’s interpretation of its inflation mandate. Inflation will average 2% in the long run.

Ironically, the regime I just proposed would probably get you closer to a 2% long run trend rate of inflation than our current inflation targeting regime, which has repeatedly missed on the low side and then let “bygones be bygones”.

As noted, they also need to learn from their mistakes of 2008, and for that I recommend more reliance on market forecasts. I certainly don’t expect them to talk about NGDP futures markets, but recommending that the Treasury issue bonds indexed to NGDP growth might be a modest first step. Perhaps the NGDP bond payoffs could be based on the third GDP announcement, which occurs roughly 3 months after the quarter ends. That data is fairly complete, although of course there are occasionally later revisions as well.

The BLS might be instructed to keep two GDP series when there is a major definitional change (such as adding software to investment), to allow an internally consistent series for bond indexing. That’s a bit messy, but these major definitional changes don’t occur very often. Don’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good.

Magical thinking

Paul Krugman has a couple of posts criticizing MMT. He tries to be polite, pointing out that at the zero bound their policy recommendations are less bad than those of advocates of austerity. But deep down he must know that this model is sheer madness.

Stephanie Kelton responds, and continues the long MMTer tradition of being unable to provide a clear explanation of the ideas. Here she responds to Krugman’s concern that massive deficits might eventually push the public debt so high that interest rates rise to a level that puts a big burden on taxpayers.

First, “there is a devil in the interest rate assumption,” as economist James K. Galbraith has explained.  Preventing a doomsday scenario is not difficult. As Galbraith explains, “the prudent policy conclusion is: keep the projected interest rate down.” Or, putting it more crudely, “It’s the Interest Rate, Stupid!”

And just how is the government supposed to “keep the projected interest rate down”? By magic?

Yes, by magic:

Since interest rates are a policy variable, all the Fed has to do is keep the interest rate below the growth rate (i<g) to prevent the ratio from rising indefinitely. As Galbraith says, “there is no need for radical reductions in future spending plans, or for cuts in Social Security or Medicare benefits to achieve this.”

Rather than presenting this as a problem for functional finance, Krugman should be wondering why the Fed would ever maintain an interest rate that would put the debt on an unsustainable trajectory. I don’t believe it would. If i>g, then debt service grows faster than GDP, which Krugman argues would be inflationary.

So his hypothetical scenario begs the question: Why would an inflation-targeting Fed permit i>g with a debt-to-GDP ratio at 300 percent? 


Notice that she doesn’t tell us how the Fed is supposed to keep the market interest rate down. It doesn’t just happen by magic. Market interest rates are not a “policy variable”; they are impacted by various policies. While the Fed directly controls the discount rate and the interest rate on reserves, the rates that really matter are market interest rates on public debt. How does the Fed keep them down?

In the short run, the Fed can lower market interest rates (to below the natural rate) via the liquidity effect of an easy money policy. To hold rates down in the long run, you need a very tight money policy, which reduces NGDP growth and thus lowers the natural rate of interest. I kept reading, waiting for an explanation of how the Fed is supposed to keep interest rates down. Easy money in the short run or persistent contractionary demand-side policies? And the answer came in the very next paragraph:

Japan serves as a pretty good example here, with a debt ratio that might well rise to 300 percent one day. Meanwhile, rates sit right where the Bank of Japan sets them, and the government easily sustains its primary deficits.

As you may know, over the past 20 years Japan’s had the most contractionary demand side policy in modern human history, with almost no growth in NGDP since 1998. So the example cited by MMTers as the way to keep rates down is the paradigmatic example of where the action is accomplished through severely depressed spending.

Yes, that will “work”, but don’t MMTers favor boosting demand? I thought they believed that even the US had deficient demand, despite having NGDP growth (red line) far higher than in Japan, even adjusting for population growth.

MMTers seem to believe that policymakers have one more degree of freedom than they actually have. If you want strong growth in spending, you must accept higher nominal interest rates. Otherwise the economy will spiral into hyperinflation.

Second, if we’re so obsessed with debt sustainability, why are we still borrowing? Remember, Lerner didn’t think of borrowing as a financing operation. He saw it as a way to conduct monetary policy – that is, to drain reserves and keep interest rates at some desired rate — as I explained here.

But the Fed no longer relies on bonds (open-market operations) to hit its interest rate target. It just pays interest on reserve balances at the target rate. Why not phase out Treasuries altogether? We could pay off the debt“tomorrow.”

Yes, you can replace all Treasuries with interest bearing reserves, which are simply another form of debt. And that insures that the interest rate you pay is no higher than the “target rate”. But again, if you set the target rate below the natural rate for an extended period you’ll end up with hyperinflation. And no, tax increases don’t prevent high inflation, as we learned in 1968.

What about Japan? Well, Japan pushed their natural interest rate to zero with the most contractionary policy for NGDP growth in all of modern history. Is that their solution? Is that their evidence that there is no natural rate of interest?

HT: Dilip

Just do it.

There are a wide variety of ways of thinking about monetary policy. In this post I’ll use some graphs to illustrate various policy options, with the goal of shedding light on some of the major debates of the past decade.

Let’s start with a shift from a zero percent target path for inflation to a 2% path. Let’s also assume that the Quantity Theory (QT) holds in the long run, in the sense that prices move in proportion to changes in the money supply, other things equal. But in the short run, money demand is negatively correlated with nominal interest rates. (Don’t worry if you don’t like the QT, this example will have anti-QT implications.)

Let’s assume that it is Japan that switches from a zero percent inflation path to a 2% inflation path. Also assume that the new path pushes nominal interest rates up from 0% to 2%. (I.e. assume a zero real rate of interest, for simplicity.) And finally, let’s assume that that demand for base money in Japan is 100% of GDP at zero interest rates and 10% of GDP at 2% nominal interest rates. (Not implausible assumptions, BTW.)

In the following graph, path A shows the path of the money supply that would push inflation from 0% to 2%, without any discontinuous change in the price level at the point where the policy change occurs.

Even though the money supply plunges by 90% at time=0, the price level does not show any immediate change. The Japanese suddenly prefer to hold much smaller cash balances, because the opportunity cost of holding base money has risen from zero to 2%/year.

Once money demand has fallen by 90%, it levels off. From that point forward, the BOJ must raise the money supply at 2%/year in order to generate 2% annual inflation. It takes 72 years for the price level to quadruple, but even then the money supply remains 60% below the level just before the change in policy.

So far I’m assuming that everything works smoothly. The policy change is credible, and is expected to persist forever. The Japanese attitude toward money changes immediately, to become more like the Australian attitude. Japanese salarymen suddenly start refusing overtime, and instead go home and put on shorts, throw a few shrimp on the backyard barbie, and make rude jokes about Sheilas.

That’s already a pretty heavy lift, but it gets much worse. Let’s suppose that the money supply follows path A for 72 years, and then is expected to level off (as in path B). What then?

In that case, everything changes even today, at time=0. The hypothesis that the BOJ could reduce the money supply by 90% and at the same time start on a path of 2% inflation is entirely dependent on the public believing that this new policy will last forever. If it lasts for “only” 72 years, the effect will be radically different.

Under path A, the price level is four times higher after 72 years. Under path B it is 60% lower than at time=0. That’s because path B leads to zero money growth and zero inflation in the long run. That means that 72 years from today, real money demand will be just as high as before the t=0 policy shift, and since the money supply is assumed to be 60% lower, the price level will also be 60% lower. The path of prices over that 72 year period will also be vastly different, but I’m not smart enough to show exactly how different.

The bottom line is that it’s dangerous to engage in money supply targeting. The path for the money supply that might achieve success with 100% credibility, could lead to total failure if it’s 100% credible for only 72 years, but not thereafter. (I believe Nick Rowe made this point earlier.)

Last year, the yen briefly appreciated on news that Prime Minister Abe might have to leave office due to a corruption scandal, and the next PM was not expected to push as hard for monetary stimulus. Now imagine a scenario where even committing to 72 years of monetary expansion is not enough!

Fortunately, Lars Svensson came up with a “foolproof” escape from a liquidity trap, which does not require any unreasonable credibility assumptions:

Why would this work? The argument proceeds in several steps, to be explained in detail below: (i) It is technically feasible for the central bank to devalue the currency and peg the exchange rate at a level corresponding to an initial real depreciation of the domestic currency relative to the steady state. (ii) If the central bank demonstrates that it both can and wants to hold the peg, the peg will be credible. That is, the private sector will expect the peg to hold in the future. (iii) When the peg is credible, the central bank has to raise the short nominal interest rate above the zero bound to a level corresponding to uncovered interest rate parity. Thus, the economy is formally out of the liquidity trap. In spite of the rise of the nominal interest rate, the long real rate falls, as we shall see. (iv) Since the initial real exchange rate corresponds to a real depreciation of the domestic currency relative to the steady state, the private sector must expect a real appreciation eventually. (v) Expected real appreciation of the currency implies, by real interest parity (2.15) and (2.16), that the long real interest rate is lower. (vi) Furthermore, given the particular crawling peg (3.4), a real appreciation of the domestic currency will arise only if domestic inflation exceeds the inflation target. Therefore, the private sector must expect inflation to eventually rise and even exceed the inflation target.

Let’s illustrate his intuition with a time series graph, showing the foreign exchange value of the Japanese yen (priced in US pennies):

Let’s assume the yen had been gradually appreciating before time=0, and then the yen were suddenly pegged to the dollar. During the period of yen appreciation, the Japanese inflation rate would be lower than in the US, on average. If the BOJ pegged the yen to the dollar, then the long run trend rate of inflation in Japan would be similar to the rate in the US. This is illustrated by path A.

Of course PPP does not always hold perfectly, and perhaps Japan needs a bit of “catch-up inflation.” After all, the Japanese economy was somewhat depressed after years of deflation at the time Svensson first developed his proposal in 2000. To make the policy even more “foolproof” you can do a one-time depreciation of the yen, and then peg the exchange rate to the dollar. That gives you a bit more inflation, and insures against a real depreciation in the yen exchange rate from exogenous factors.

It’s actually very likely that under this policy the money supply in Japan would look much like what I showed in the first graph above. But you can’t make the opposite argument. There is no reason to assume that adopting the money supply path shown in the first graph would lead to an exchange rate graph that looks even remotely like what we see in the second graph.

This is why QE by itself is a rather clumsy instrument. What a central bank actually needs to do is commit to do enough QE to hit some sort of price target (such as exchange rates or NGDP futures prices), and if they do so they might not have to do any QE at all (as in the first graph, where they actually reduce the money supply).

Exchange rate targeting has one important advantage over money supply targeting; the money supply is automatically adjusted to reflect the degree to which the public finds the policy target to be credible. If it’s not credible, you inject much more money than if it is credible. You inject enough money to keep exchange rates stable and on target, which is also enough money to accommodate the demand for money under the new policy regime.

Svensson’s proposal is an example of a NeoFisherian monetary policy, a more expansionary monetary policy that is associated with a rise in nominal interest rates, even in the very short run. Therefore it may be useful to use this graphical approach to compare the New Keynesian and NeoFisherian policy options.

The next graph shows two possible paths for the exchange rate, two very different monetary policies. (Think of a country like Singapore, that uses the exchange rate as its monetary policy instrument.) And yet, as we will see, the change in nominal interest rates may well be identical in the two cases, even though one policy is highly expansionary while the other is highly contractionary.

Path A is a contractionary NeoFisherian monetary policy, sudden currency appreciation with a commitment for even more appreciation in the future. This is effectively what the Swiss National Bank did in January 2015. The franc appreciated and Swiss interest rates fell due to the Fisher effect. (Or the interest parity condition, if you prefer.)

Path B is an expansionary New Keynesian policy, currency depreciation with a commitment to gradually appreciate the currency only part way back to the original level. This is “Dornbusch overshooting”, and is effectively what the US did when it announced QE1 in March 2009. The dollar fell 6 cents against the euro on the day of the announcement.

Importantly, both monetary policies are “low interest rate policies”, even as one is highly expansionary and one is highly contractionary. That’s because both feature expected currency appreciation after the initial shock, and interest parity implies that this depresses domestic interest rates.

Some people are tempted to argue that the direct effect of low rates is always expansionary; while in the NeoFisherian case this effect is offset by currency appreciation. But that’s wrong, there is no direct effect of interest rates. Changes in market interest rates are always the effect of some more fundamental monetary operation, such as open market sales, discount loans, IOR, reserve requirements, forward guidance, etc. It’s hard, but you have to stop thinking about changing market interest rates as a policy, and instead think about market interest rates as the effect of various policies.

I hope these exercises are of more than academic interest. In my view, they help us to better understand that the sort of monetary regimes that are effective have several things in common:

First, they target a price, such as the price of gold, the price of foreign exchange, the price of CPI futures, the price of NGDP futures or some sort of complex mixture of asset prices that are believed to reflect NGDP expectations. (Hopefully not the stock market, which seems to be the current obsession of the Fed.)

Second, the policy does “whatever it takes” to hit the price target. This means that the market determines the needed level of concrete steps, which will depend on the policy’s credibility.

Third, less credible policies will require more concrete steps, and hence more controversial monetary policy actions. Ironically, a clear and strong “whatever it takes” approach will boost policy credibility, and therefore require less aggressive concrete steps than a more timid approach.

Lars Svensson understood these principles back in 2000. Here are the three steps in his foolproof policy (from the 2003 version of the model):

(1) Announce an upward-sloping price-level target path . . . for the domestic price level . . .

(2a) Announce that the currency will be devalued and that the exchange rate will be pegged to a crawling exchange-rate target . . . That is, the central bank makes a commitment to buy and sell unlimited amounts of foreign currency at the [targeted] exchange rate . . .

(3) Then, just do it.

Svensson seems to be a Nike shoe fan, while I prefer Yoda’s version:

Do. Or do not. There is no try.