Krugman vs. Hamilton/Cole/Ohanian on FDR’s high wage policy
There’s been a lot of recent debate about Cole and Ohanian’s claim that FDR’s New Deal slowed the recovery. Here I’ll focus on his high wage policies, which Krugman argues could have actually increased output (as the AD curve may slope upward in a liquidity trap.) While there are lots of sophisticated econometric studies (often using highly misleading annual data), I don’t know of anyone else who has simply looked at the monthly industrial production data around each wage shock.
There were actually five wage shocks, four of which are easily dated. As part of the National Industrial Recovery Act, FDR ordered an across the board 20% hourly wage increase in late July 1933, and then further increases in the spring of 1934. At the same time the workweek was reduced about 20%. The NIRA was declared unconstitutional in 1935, but a minimum wage was instituted in November 1938, and raised a year later. To say the IP data is bad for the Krugman interpretation would be an understatement. These numbers are horrendous:
Table 12.2: Four month (nonannualized!) growth rates for industrial production
Before After
July 1933 wage shock +57.4% -18.8%
May 1934 wage shock +11.9% -15.0%
Nov. 1938 wage shock +15.8% +2.5%
Nov. 1939 wage shock +16.0% -6.5%
You’ll notice that I left out the fifth wage shock, but its no better for Krugman’s view, just messier. Historians argue that the huge union drives of late 1936 and 1937 were due to both the Wagner Act and FDR’s massive election victory. Whatever the cause of the union gains, they led to rapid wage increases in late 1936 and much of 1937. This time, monthly industrial production did not fall immediately, as prices were also rising fast in late 1936 and early 1937. But when prices stopped rising, industrial production began falling sharply under the burden of high wages.
Progressives like to portray opponents of the New Deal as reactionaries. Parts of the New Deal (such as dollar devaluation) were very helpful. But FDR’s high wage policy was a disaster. As James Hamilton said (in defending his criticism of programs like the NIRA and the AAA):
I openly confess to believing that government policies that were explicitly designed to limit manufacturing, agricultural, and mining output may indeed have had the effect of limiting manufacturing, agricultural, and mining output.
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26. February 2009 at 16:51
[…] When it sets out to destroy the economy: http://blogsandwikis.bentley.edu/themoneyillusion/?p=48 […]
3. March 2009 at 18:06
I always enjoy simplified explanations. Wages go up…production goes down. They must (obviously) be related.
A decrease in production couldn’t be related to, oh, I don’t know… say falling demand?
In the last few years we’ve had wages going down (relative to all other relevant indexes) and yet, production is also going down. How could that be?
5. March 2009 at 12:29
Quidam, If you regress industrial production on nominal wages and wholesale prices separately, you get the same result for the post 1933 period. Higher prices boost output AD, higher wages reduce them. For the 1920s and early 1930s, when there were no artificial wage shocks, there is no correlation between W and IP. What happened after 1933?
16. June 2009 at 17:45
[…] the economy, and even might have helped the recovery. For my evidence, check out this data from a very early post, which some of my more recent readers might not have noticed: There were actually five wage shocks, […]
16. July 2009 at 16:59
[…] during periods of near zero interest rates and very rapid economic growth. And as I showed in this post, each time the policy brought promising recoveries from the Great Depression to a screeching […]
16. July 2009 at 23:49
[…] during periods of near zero interest rates and very rapid economic growth. And as I showed in this post, each time the policy brought promising recoveries from the Great Depression to a screeching halt. […]
17. July 2009 at 15:44
[…] has looked at ‘high wage’ policies during the Great Depression – this is an experiement FDR tried five times. There were actually five wage shocks, four of which […]
14. December 2009 at 19:26
[…] that high wage policies can actually help the economy during a Depression. This is from one of my first posts: Table 12.2: Four month (nonannualized!) growth rates for industrial […]
16. December 2009 at 12:42
[…] If you prefer specific facts to textbook arguments, see Scott Sumner’s legendary Table 12.2 on wages and the Great […]
11. February 2011 at 17:04
[…] 2. 第二ã®è¦ç´ ã¯FDRï¼ˆãƒ«ãƒ¼ã‚ºãƒ™ãƒ«ãƒˆå¤§çµ±é ˜ï¼‰ã«ã‚ˆã‚‹5ã¤ã®è³ƒé‡‘ショックã®ã†ã¡ç¬¬3ã®ã‚‚ã®ã§ã€5ã¤ä¸ã§ã¯æ”¿åºœã®æ”¿ç–ã¨ã®é–¢ä¿‚ãŒè–„ã„ã‚‚ã®ã 。1936å¹´ã®çµ‚ã‚ã‚Šã‹ã‚‰1937å¹´ã®å¤§éƒ¨åˆ†ã®æœŸé–“を通ã˜ã¦åŠ´åƒçµ„åˆã®åŠ 入者ãŒæ€¥å¢—ã—ãŸã€‚1935å¹´ã®ãƒ¯ã‚°ãƒŠãƒ¼æ³•ã«ã‚ˆã£ã¦çµ„åˆã®çµ„ç¹”ãŒå®¹æ˜“ã«ãªã‚Šã€1936å¹´ã«ã¯FDRãŒå¤§çµ±é ˜é¸ã§åœ§å‹ã—ãŸãŸã‚ã€çµ„åˆã®æŒ‡å°Žè€…ãŸã¡ã¯ãƒ¯ã‚·ãƒ³ãƒˆãƒ³ã¯è‡ªåˆ†é”ã®å‘³æ–¹ã ã¨ç¢ºä¿¡ã—ã™ã‚‹ã‚ˆã†ã«ãªã£ãŸã€‚ã“ã‚Œã«ã£ã¦è³ƒé‡‘ショックãŒèµ·ã“ã£ãŸå‹•ãã¯WPIã®ãƒãƒ–ルã®å‹•ãã¨ä¼¼ã¦ãŠã‚Šã€æ™‚é–“çš„ã«ã¯åŠå¹´å¾Œã‚ã«ãšã‚Œã¦ã„ãŸã€‚賃金ã¯WPIを追ã„ã‹ã‘ã¦ä¸Šæ˜‡ã—ã€è¿½ã„ã‹ã‘ã¦ãƒ”ークã«é”ã—ã€è¿½ã„ã‹ã‘ã¦ä¸‹è½ã—ãŸã€‚ […]
29. September 2011 at 09:00
[…] Why the Keynesians are wrong about FDR’s high wage policy […]
13. February 2013 at 08:46
[…] tried to artificially raise the nominal wage rate 5 times during the 1930s. Each increase was followed by a sharp slowdown in industrial production […]
13. February 2013 at 12:09
[…] unveiled last night, and has some concerns. FDR tried to artificially raise the nominal wage rate 5 times during the 1930s. Each increase was followed by a sharp slowdown in industrial production […]
14. March 2013 at 06:28
The problem with this debate and with the literature on the NIRA in general is that it is taken out of context. FDR and the Brains Trust are made out to be raving lunatics, raising wages in some Frankensteinian experiment.
The truth of the matter is that the higher wage provisions of the NIRA were based on the generally-accepted view that productivity gains had exceeded wage gains throughout the 1920s and was one of the chief causes of the Great Depression. Heck, Henry Ford doubled wages in 1914! Did employment at Ford go down? No!!!!
It bears reminding that trade associations, unions, and investors, not to mention the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufactures, all supported the NIRA.
The problem, as I see it, is the facile and misleading nature of Walrasian analysis.
22. February 2017 at 10:40
[…] “FDR tried to artificially raise the nominal wage rate 5 times during the 1930s. Each increase was followed by a sharp slowdown in industrial production […]
19. April 2017 at 05:51
[…] http://www.themoneyillusion.com/?p=48 […]