Archive for May 2015

 
 

How many more populist “victories” can we survive?

Here’s Salon on the Greece government’s “victory” last February:

One week after Greece’s leftist government reached a new debt deal with its creditors, Paul Krugman argues in his New York Times column today that left-wing criticism of the deal is misguided, obscuring larger victories secured by Greek negotiators.

And here’s Paul Krugman in 2012 on Argentina’s “remarkable success.”

Matt Yglesias, who just spent time in Argentina, writes about the lessons of that country’s recovery following its exit from the one-peso-one-dollar “convertibility law”. As he says, it’s a remarkable success story, one that arguably holds lessons for the euro zone.

I’d just add something else: press coverage of Argentina is another one of those examples of how conventional wisdom can apparently make it impossible to get basic facts right. We keep getting stories about Ireland’s recovery when there is, in fact, no recovery “” but there should be, darn it, because they’ve done the “right” thing, so that’s what we’ll report.

And conversely, articles about Argentina are almost always very negative in tone “” they’re irresponsible, they’re renationalizing some industries, they talk populist, so they must be going very badly.

In fairness, they did have a very strong cyclical rebound after easing monetary policy (an issue on which I agree with Krugman.)  Where I disagree is his tendency to sort of wave away supply-side concerns—which are what matters in the long run.  It looks like the long run has arrived, as the Argentine economy has sputtered over the three years since he wrote this post, and 2015 will be downright ugly.

From the same post, Krugman has good things to say about Brazil’s slightly more moderate, but still hopelessly statist policy regime:

Just to be clear, I think Brazil is going pretty well, and has had good leadership. But why exactly is Brazil an impressive “BRIC” while Argentina is always disparaged? Actually, we know why “” but it doesn’t speak well for the state of economics reporting.

Why was Argentina disparaged?  Perhaps because some of us don’t have a “in the long run we are all dead” Keynesian obsession with the demand-side.  We saw problems down the road. BTW, the Argentine president who created the disaster died in 2010, leaving his wife to inherit the mess “in the long run.” Brazil has also done very poorly in the three years since Krugman praised its (incompetent) leadership, and the forecasts reported in the next link call the outlook for Brazil’s economy in 2015 “grim.”  Nor will boosting AD perform miracles, Brazil and Argentina already have lots of inflation.

Here’s the outlook for the key economies in Latin America next year:

Many Latin American economies will continue to face increasing growth divergence this year, which is neatly defined by the two oceans that envelop the region. The Atlantic-facing economies of Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela””the largest members of the Mercosur bloc””will contract 0.2%, 0.9%, 5.5%, respectively, according to LatinFocus Consensus Forecasts panelists. On the other side of the continent, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru””which make up the Pacific Alliance””will expand 2.9%, 3.4%, 2.9% and 3.5%, respectively.

Let’s see, I’m trying to remember which side had the more statist policy regimes, the Atlantic or the Pacific bloc?  The next paragraph answers the question:

This division has little to do with the western countries’ orientation toward a more dynamic Asia and the eastern countries’ exposure to the European economies, which are still weak. In fact, the growth divergence is mainly the result of the substantial differences in each country’s economic policy during a decade-long economic boom, which was fuelled by high commodities prices and strong inflows of foreign direct investment. Throughout the boom years, Atlantic countries spent more and saved less, while the Pacific-facing countries invested more. Moreover, many governments in the Atlantic-facing countries implemented more interventionist economic policies, which put a dent in businesses’ profits and discouraged investment. Conversely, countries bordering the Pacific undertook agendas of economic reforms, which investors welcomed.

But that doesn’t make any sense. How could the Pacific countries be doing better, when they relied more on the brain dead supply-side approach of the GOP?  Of course Krugman told us that Chile’s supposed free market success is just “Fantasies of the Chicago Boys.

But there’s another point: the economics of Chile under Pinochet are a lot more ambiguous than legend has it. The way the story is told now, the free-market guys moved in, liberalized, and then there was a boom.

Actually, as you can see from the chart above, what happened was this: Chile had a huge economic crisis in the early 70s, which was, yes, partly due to Allende and the accompanying turmoil. Then the country experienced a recovery driven in large part by massive capital inflows, which mostly consisted of making up the lost ground. Then there was a huge crisis again in the early 1980s “” part of the broader Latin debt crisis, but Chile was hit much worse than other major players. It wasn’t until the late 1980s, by which time the hard-line free-market policies had been considerably softened, that Chile finally moved definitively ahead of where it had been in the early 70s.

There’s no question the Chicago Boys screwed up in the early 1980s, by ignoring Milton Friedman’s (and Paul Krugman’s) advice to float your currency.  But what about that supposed “softening” of free market policies?  Here’s the Fraser Institute rankings of economic freedom in Chile (index number out of 10, and then global ranking), since the Chicago-style reforms began in 1975:

1975:    3.60  (71)

1980:   5.38  (48)

1990:    6.78  (27)

2000:   7.41  (33)

2010:   7.94   (7)

If there are “fantasies,” it’s the idea that Chile became less market-oriented after the late 1970s.

Perhaps Brazil could try some Paul Romerstyle charter cities on its poverty-stricken northeast coast.  You know, the kind of free trade zone that was adopted by another country advised by Friedman at about the same time he advised the brutal Pinochet regime. This regime was far more brutal, and yet oddly Friedman got no criticism from the left for his advice, perhaps because the left was embarrassed by the fact that so many of their famous intellectuals had praised the regime over the previous decades, as they killed tens of millions of people.  Have you guessed which one?  Hint, it’s right after Chile in alphabetical order.  And the main street in its biggest free trade zone went from looking like this in 1981:

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To this in 2013:

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Brazil might want to contact Mr. Romer.

Baltimore’s decline

Here are the 10 biggest cities in America in 1950, when most hit their peak:

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Tyler Cowen recently linked to an article that has lots of interesting information about Baltimore’s decline.

As a result of Baltimore’s multiple social, economic, and educational problems, the city’s population has declined from 939,000 in 1960 to just622,000 today. In silent, gloomy testament to this prolonged exodus, some47,000 abandoned houses and 16,000 vacant buildings now stand like pulled teeth in Baltimore’s urban landscape.

I thought it might be useful to put that decline into some sort of perspective.  Thus I’ll list the population of these same 10 cities in 2013 (many are no longer top 10) as well as the ratio to their 1950 populations.  Then I’ll suggest 5 groupings:

New York  8405k  106.5%

Chicago  2719k    75.1%

LA    3884k   197.2%

Philly   1553k   75.0%

Detroit  689k   37.2%

Baltimore  622k   65.5%

Cleveland   390k  42.6%

St Louis   318k  37.1%

Washington   646k  80.5%

Boston  645k     80.5%

I see 5 groupings:

Cities hitting record population, and still growing.  (NYC, LA)

Cities down substantially, but growing really fast since 2010 (Boston & DC, which were both smaller than Baltimore as recently as 2010.)

Cities down substantially and growing modestly (Chicago, Philly)

Cities down substantially and barely growing (Baltimore)

And cities down catastrophically and still losing population (The terrible three; Detroit, Cleveland and St. Louis.)

A few observations.

1.  Some of the population decline since 1950 is due to smaller families.  Thus a city with exactly the same number of houses might have 25% fewer people due to lower birthrates.  Older American cities are hemmed in by suburbs, which generally grow as the inner city declines.  Almost all of the older cities were losing population until 1990, if only due to smaller families, but the more dynamic ones have recently turned it around.

2.  One possibility is that Baltimore is underperforming due to governance issues. That might seem surprising, as its population numbers are far better than the terrible three.  Indeed the rust belt also has many smaller examples of catastrophic population loss (Buffalo, Gary, Flint, Youngstown, etc.)  But Baltimore seems more like Philadelphia, a fairly big city in the shadow of a more dynamic neighbor (DC and NYC, respectively.)  As recently as 1990 Baltimore still had 77.5% of its peak population, while Philly had 76.5%, DC had 75.7% and Boston had 71.7%. It was holding its own.  Then it started falling dramatically behind other cities in that group.  I see Philly as the closest comparison because they are geographically close, and lack the special characteristics of Chicago, Boston and DC. Both are big, bland east coast cities with a few strong points (Johns Hopkins, Penn, historical neighborhoods, etc.)

3.  The first time I ever heard of urban revival was Baltimore’s Inner Harbor project, which was soon followed by Boston’s Quincy Market.  Obviously things didn’t pan out for Baltimore.

4.  I think Chicago’s data masks a tale of two cities.  It’s 1/2 catastrophic rust belt and 1/2 Manhattan.  It’s numbers end up halfway between Detroit and NYC.

5.  I recently visited the St Louis Fed, and learned about its history.  When the Fed was created, St. Louis was America’s 4th biggest city.  Now it’s smaller than many cities that most Americans have never even heard of (Aurora, Santa Ana, Mesa, etc.)

6.  AFAIK all of America’s catastrophic urban failures lie on a line from St. Louis to Buffalo, passing through Gary, Detroit and Cleveland.  I wonder why?  (Excluding much smaller cities like Camden.)  Even Newark still has 63% of its peak (1930) population.

7.  East coast cities are clearly more dynamic that midwest cities.  But oddly the Midwest has grown faster than the Northeast since 2000, by 5.0% vs. 4.6%. Midwesterners are more inclined toward suburban living.  (The West grew 18.5% and the South grew 19.1%.)

Update:  The New Zealand iPredict NGDP futures markets are up and running. I’ll have a formal announcement later today.

Short takes

1.  Lars Christensen is now available to do public speaking.  Please hire him.

2.  Speaking of which, Warren Buffett needs to spend more time reading market monetarist blogs.  But at least he understands labor economics.

3.  Ed Dolan has the wrong test of fiscal policy.  He includes lots of eurozone countries for which monetary offset does not apply. Numerous researchers who have done the correct regression (for countries with an independent monetary policy) find no effect.

4.  David Beckworth says Fed policy contributed to the housing boom.  My view is that a counterfactual of 5% NGDP growth, level targeting, would have seen a smaller housing boom, but only slightly smaller.

5.  Marcus Nunes sent me a long NYT article on the question of whether the Fed should raise its inflation target to 4%. Space devoted to the level targeting option?  Zero.  Space devoted to the NGDP targeting option?  Zero.

6.  David Levey pointed me to another British blog advocating NGDPLT, by Anton Howes.

7.  On June 18, 2008, the Fed thought 2009 would be a pretty decent year.  At the time they knew full well that the US housing market was in a horrific free fall.  What they didn’t know is that they had set their interest rate target at a level that would soon produce the biggest fall in NGDP since the 1930s.  It began within days of this forecast, long before Lehman failed.

8.  I wish journals like the AER had more articles similar to this Scott Alexander blog post.  And this excellent follow-up is quite, well . . . depressing.

9.  Are Texas and Arizona dramatically less racist than New York and New Jersey?  Maybe.  But I wouldn’t draw that conclusion based on this study.

10.  Are you a white or black person, and feel like you are a nobody.  Go to China and get involved in real estate promotion. This very amusing 6 minute video shows how.

11.  Scientists like experiments.  Businesses likes experiments.  Artists like experiments.  Governments hate experiments. More than 200 governments control over 50 million square miles of land.  Many of the governments are pathetic, and much of the land is useless.  But they won’t allow even 5 square miles for an experiment in governance.  Not one of them.  Not even the worst of them.  Not even on worthless land.  Paul Romer doesn’t seem that scary to me.  What are they afraid of?

Yes, I know, politics isn’t about good governance.

12.  Speaking of which, lots of people (including me) like to pose as rebels, but the blogosphere contains only one true radical.  Everyone else is struggling to overcome homo sapien bias.

Inflation doesn’t matter (NGDP growth does)

Simon sent me a new NBER paper on inflation by Coibion, Gorodnichenko and Kumar.  Here is the abstract:

We implement a new survey of firms’ macroeconomic beliefs in New Zealand and document a number of novel stylized facts from this survey. Despite nearly twenty-five years under an inflation targeting regime, there is widespread dispersion in firms’ beliefs about both past and future macroeconomic conditions, especially inflation, with average beliefs about recent and past inflation being much higher than those of professional forecasters. Much of the dispersion in beliefs can be explained by firms’ incentives to collect and process information, i.e. rational inattention motives. Using experimental methods, we find that firms update their beliefs in a Bayesian manner when presented with new information about the economy. But few firms seem to think that inflation is important to their business decisions and therefore they tend to devote few resources to collecting and processing information about inflation.

I can’t imagine why a firm would care about inflation.  On the other hand NGDP growth would be at least somewhat important, as it would be linked to the growth in revenue they could expect to earn, and also the growth in costs such as wages that they’d have to pay their workers.

Never reason from an oil price change

Back in late 2014, many pundits assured us that falling oil prices were bullish for the economy.  I countered that one should never reason from an oil price change.  The net effect is ambiguous.  As the following graph shows, industrial production had been rising fast in the period leading up to November 2014, but has been falling ever since.  GDP was almost flat in Q1, and the Atlanta Fed says growth will also be slow in Q2.

That does NOT mean falling oil prices hurt the economy, an equally unjustified assumption.  Rather it is monetary policy (NGDP growth) that drives short run changes in output.  NRFPC!

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