Archive for November 2014

 
 

John Cochrane on the stability of interest rate pegging

Here’s John Cochrane replying to a post by Nick Rowe:

The last 5 years have brought us a delicious opportunity for measurement. Once we hit the zero bound, interest rates can’t move any more. So the whole problem of empirically verifying long run dynamics is a lot easier.

What happened when the Fed kept interest rates at zero for 5 years? Pretty much nothing! OK, you see inflation going up and down, but look at the left hand scale — one percentage point. Given the colossal scale of other events in the economy, that’s nothing. Japan has been at it even longer, with similar results.

We seem to have in front of us a pretty clear measurement that long run dynamics are stable.

“Nothing” is astounding. This dog that did not bark has demolished a lot of macroeconomic beliefs:

  • MV = PY. Sorry, we loved you. But when reserves go from $50 billion to $3 trillion and nothing at all happens to inflation — or at most we’re arguing about percentage points — it has to go out the window.

  • Keynesian deflationary spirals. Just as much as monetarists worried about hyperinflation, Keyensians’ forecast of a deflationary spiral just didn’t happen.

I can certainly understand why Cochrane would make this argument.  It seems to make a lot of sense.  But that’s only because the standard model is infected by Keynesianism, which leaves it vulnerable to attack. Here’s one reply:

Yes, the Taylor Principle stabilizes prices during normal times, when interest rates are positive. And yes a rigid and positive interest rate peg is supposed to lead to highly unstable dynamics.  But that’s because if you target interest rates at a positive level and if there is no interest on reserves, then you lose control over the monetary base, which flies off to zero or infinity.  In contrast, at the zero bound you regain control over the base.  Thus once the Fed and BOJ lost the ability to adjust interest rates, they started using QE to prevent deflation.  (Of course with IOR you hit the “liquidity trap” that much sooner, but regain control of the base that much sooner.)

That’s the sort of reply I’d expect from Nick Rowe.  But then I’d also expect Nick to go further, and point out that this just shows how dangerous it is to describe the stance of monetary policy by using interest rates.  Here’s what actually makes the Taylor Principle work:

1.  When inflation is above target you need to reduce the growth rate of the money supply (relative to the growth rate of money demand) enough to bring inflation back down to the target.  It just so happens that the sort of policy that would reduce the money supply growth by an adequate amount is also one that will result in nominal interest rates rising in the short run (due to the liquidity effect) by roughly 150% of the rise in inflation.  But that rise in interest rates is not why inflation falls back to the target path (it’s an epiphenomenon), it falls back because you’ve reduced the growth rate of the money supply relative to demand.  Inflation falls back for monetarist reasons, not Keynesian reasons.

2.  Now suppose you are at the zero bound.  The Keynesian model requires something radically different, whereas the monetarist model just keeps plugging along with the same old method—adjusting the money supply relative to changes in money demand.  No ad hoc additions are needed for the monetarist model, unlike the Keynesian model.

But what about Cochrane’s criticism of the M*V=P*Y model?  What about his observation that reserves have soared while prices have hardly budged?  Unfortunately, there is no such model.  No one has ever proposed an M*V=P*Y model.  No one has ever claimed that inflation is proportional to reserves.  The most distinguished monetarist of all time was Milton Friedman, who famously argued that reserves are not a good indicator, and that money was tight during the 1930-33 deflation despite the huge rise in bank reserves due to Herbert Hoover’s QE.  There’s nothing new under the sun.  Nothing to be explained here; just move right along.

Sophisticated quantity theorists have always understood that the demand for bank reserves can be very large at zero nominal rates, especially when interest is paid on reserves (but even if it is not.) At the zero bound expectations (which are always about 98% of monetary policy) become 99.5% of monetary policy.  So I guess I was exaggerating a bit; the zero bound really is slightly different, but only quantitatively, not qualitatively.

An interest rate peg can lead to hyperinflation or hyper-deflation precisely because it can lead to upward or downward spirals in the monetary base.  That spiral does not generally occur at the zero bound, and hence there is no “stability” mystery to explain.  Unless you are a Keynesian.

I don’t want to sound too negative here–for some reason I had never really thought about that flaw in the standard Keynesian model until I had to think about how to respond to Cochrane’s post. That’s what makes the blogosphere so great.

 

The mother of all gender gaps

Commenter Floccina sent me the following interesting finding, from Michele Martinez Campbell:

A fascinating new national poll from Quinnipiac University shows that men and women disagree markedly on the question of marijuana legalization.  While men surveyed strongly favor legalization by a margin of 59 to 36 percent, women oppose it by a clear majority of 52-44 percent.  This 15-point gender gap in support for marijuana legalization -let’s call it the “pot gender gap” “” is not quite as large as the 20-point gender gap in support for President Obama in the 2012 presidential election, but it is striking.  What’s most interesting, though, is how it confounds the expectations set by the voting gender gap.  In voting, women trend more liberal and Democratic, while men trend more conservative and Republican.  Yet with the pot gender gap, we see women taking the more conservative, law-and-order approach.

I was a bit puzzled by this claim, as those numbers seem to indicate a 31 point gender gap, the way I usually calculate the gap.  There is an alternative method that would yield a 15 point gap.  However when you follow the link to the supposedly larger 2012 election gender gap, you get the following, from Jeffrey Jones:

PRINCETON, NJ — President Barack Obama won the two-party vote among female voters in the 2012 election by 12 points, 56% to 44%, over Republican challenger Mitt Romney. Meanwhile, Romney won among men by an eight-point margin, 54% to 46%. That total 20-point gender gap is the largest Gallup has measured in a presidential election since it began compiling the vote by major subgroups in 1952.

That uses the approach I am more familiar with. But by that approach, the drug gap is actually 31%, which makes the drug legalization gender gap far larger than the biggest presidential election gender gap ever recorded.  A 31 point gap is mind-boggling by itself, but it’s even more astounding when you consider it reverses the normal liberal/conservative split between men and women.  This fact would tell us a lot about politics, if we bothered to pay attention.  Instead all you see in the media is endless generalizations about the left and the right, as if the views of African-Americans on social issues, for instance, could be understood simply by noting the fact that they tend to vote Democratic.  People are really complicated.

NarcoLaw’s best guess (an informed guess, but a guess nevertheless) is that female opposition stems from questions about the impact legalization will have on public health, crime and the social fabric.

I think the health/social fabric worries are wrong—but defensible.  But the crime argument isn’t even defensible.  Of course that’s just one person’s “best guess,” it would be interesting to get better data.  Why isn’t this issue being intensively studied?  What are the gender gaps on government invasion of privacy (TSA/NRA/CIA, etc?)  What is the gender gap on immigration?  I have no idea what the gap is on many of the most important issues facing our country, and no reason to think it correlates in any particular way with how each gender votes. (Democratic pols are supposedly more likely to support legalization.–but is even that true?  Is there any data?)

BTW,  I have many commenters in both the liberal and conservative camps.  But they almost all seem to favor drug legalization.  And I’d guess over 90% are male.  There are entire realms of our political reality that are almost invisible in the blogosphere.

PS.  There are also some big gender gaps in academics, which are just as perplexing as in drug legalization.  For instance, women get higher grades in college, despite getting lower average scores on SATs.  This might reflect some sort of difference in cognitive styles.  Let me throw out a hypothesis (and feel free to scold me for sexism if appropriate.)  Is it possible that men approach the issue from more of a “legalistic” perspective.  I.e. “legalizing drugs doesn’t mean one endorses their use.”  And women might approach the issue from a more “contextual” framework; “while legalization doesn’t necessarily endorse their use, it implicitly connotes the fact that society regards drug use as ‘OK’.”   It seems to me that women are at least slightly more likely to say things like “so what you are really saying is . . .”   Another thought is that men might be more individualistic; “no one can tell me what I can or cannot do,” whereas women might be more used to thinking in a social context; “how does this impact the family?”  These might all be stereotypes on my part, but the gender gap is certainly very real; 31 points is way outside the margin of error for a public opinion poll.  Marijuana is illegal in America mostly because women want it illegal.  Just to be clear, I am not trying to pick on women here.  My views on other issues like use of military force and reproductive rights are more “feminine” than masculine.

PPS.  A gap that big cannot be accounted for by the fact that somewhat more men than women use illegal drugs.  Or by the fact that women care more about children.  Do dads want their sons to get addicted?  And do moms really want their sons to go to prison?

PPPS.  Off topic, I love this Sunstein post on Hayek.

Go ahead Barack, choom one for old times’ sake

There wasn’t much good news last night, although I guess we can applaud the public employee unions in Wisconsin getting spanked for the third consecutive time.  And I’d love to see the look on the faces of all those anti-supply-side economics reporters as Brownback won by 4 points after “wrecking” the Kansas economy.  But there was one clear bright spot–pot was legalized in Oregon, Alaska and DC, all three of the locations where the referendum was on the ballot.  (The failure of medical marijuana in Florida indicates that full success will require the dying off of a few more old people.  “One funeral at a time . . . “)

After last night Barack could probably use a joint.  Now that it’s legal in DC, I see no reason for him to abstain.  (Actually DC only partially legalized pot, selling it is still illegal.)

As is often the case, the public is way ahead of the politicians on pot legalization.

(And don’t spoil the fun by telling me the law has yet to be implemented.)

Update:  I missed the big story; California voters downgraded all types of drug possession from a felony to a misdemeanor, which will free thousands of innocent people who are currently imprisoned in America.  Great news!  (The effort received funding from both liberal and conservative business tycoons.)

PS.  My own state legalized casino gambling last night.  Over the last few decades Massachusetts voters have repealed rent control statewide, rejected progressive income taxes, decriminalized marijuana and legalized casino gambling.  Also the first state with gay marriage.  Not yet a libertarian paradise, but moving in the right direction.  Now if only Kansas would catch up to Massachusetts, and reject progressive income taxes.

PPS.  FWIW I favored a GOP Senate and Democratic House for immigration reform reasons. Obviously I didn’t get my wish.

PPPS.  Conservative Alaska legalized pot in an off year dominated by GOP voters.  But lawmakers in very liberal Hawaii have rejected even the milder decriminalization.  Otherwise pot is effectively legal for users on the entire West Coast, as anyone can get a medical marijuana license in California.

Does monetary policy “cause” changes in NGDP?

Suppose that there are 6 ways the government could have prevented the 2008 financial crisis.  One might be abolishing moral hazard (FDIC, TBTF, the GSEs, etc.)  Another might have been to ban subprime mortgages made with taxpayer-insured funds.  Another might have been higher capital requirements.  Another might have been to require bankers to post personal bonds in case their bank failed (or needed to be bailed out), like on the old days.  Another might have been NGDPLT. Etc., etc.  In that case one might argue that failure to do one of those things “caused” the crisis.  Of course there are many ways of thinking about causation, but I find policy counterfactuals to be one of the most useful ways of describing causation.

Before considering whether money causes NGDP, I like to consider some related questions.

1.  I would argue that between 1879 and 1968 monetary policy “caused” the price of gold.  For most of the period the price was fixed by the monetary policymakers.  But even in 1933-34, when the price rose sharply, I’d argue it was “caused” by monetary policy, in the sense that the Fed was targeting the price of gold.  In contrast, the Fed was not targeting the price of gold in recent years, so the increase was not caused by the Fed in any useful sense of the term ’cause.’

2.  So if the Fed targeted gold prices from 1879-1968, does that mean other variables like the price level and NGDP were endogenous, and hence not caused by the Fed?  It’s debatable whether they were completely endogenous, but let’s say they were.  I’d still argue that the sharp decline in the price level and NGDP during 1929-33 was caused by the Fed.  And that’s because I’d argue that gold price targeting was not a wise policy, and that a desirable counterfactual policy would have been to stabilize either the price level of NGDP during 1929-33.  The Fed’s failure to do so caused the Depression.

3.  Now suppose the Fed is targeting inflation.  In that case any change in RGDP growth will lead to an equal change in NGDP growth.  Changes in NGDP will have nothing to do with monetary policy. Or at least it seems that way.  But not necessarily.  Suppose inflation is a bad target, because labor market instability (due to sticky nominal wages) and debt market instability (due to nominal debts) is much more closely related to NGDP fluctuations than to inflation fluctuations.  In that case a central bank that is targeting prices could be said to have “caused” a deep recession by letting NGDP fall, even if it was hitting its inflation target perfectly, and RGDP was falling for other reasons.  Of course it’s debatable as to whether its useful to consider the central bank to be to blame for the deeper recession, but it’s certainly not implausible, and indeed is the prediction of the standard AS/AD model used in econ textbooks.  In the graph below when you are targeting P and there is a negative supply shock, then NGDP will fall.  In that case you go to point E6, a deep recession.  If you were targeting NGDP when this supply shock hit, you’d have a mild recession (E7)Screen Shot 2014-11-04 at 8.28.43 AM.

It’s certain fair game to blame the Fed for depressing AD in response to a negative supply shock, even if 100% of the fall in NGDP is “caused” by a fall in RGDP.

Nominal GDP growth is the sum of a real and a nominal variable; real GDP growth and inflation. And yet (paradoxically) NGDP growth is a 100% nominal variable, completely under the control of monetary policymakers.  Whether it is useful to think in terms of NGDP fluctuations “causing” recessions depends on how you think the business cycle would be affected by a counterfactual policy of NGDPLT.

Similarly, changes in the nominal price of a gold (a 100% nominal variable) are the sum of a nominal and a real variable (inflation, and changes in the relative price of gold.)  In 1933-34 it was useful to think of the rising price of gold at an indicator of easy money.  More recently (in the early 2010s) it was not useful to think in terms of the rising price of gold as indicating an easy money policy.  In 1933-34 the price of gold was used as a signaling device for the future path of monetary policy.  That was not true in 2010-12.  I’d like to use some of these ideas to analyze part of a Tyler Cowen post from a couple years back:

My worry is that some Market Monetarists speak of ngdp as if it is some block of stuff, handed down from on high (of course in the past our central banks have not been targeting ngdp).  It’s as if ngdp determines the size of the room, and a carpenter is then asked to build a house within that room.  If the room is too small, a large house cannot be built.  Or, if you are not given enough clay, you cannot build a very large sculpture.  Along these lines, if the growth path of ngdp is not robust enough, the economy cannot do well.

I get nervous at how ngdp lumps together real and nominal in one variable, and I get nervous at how the passive voice is applied to ngdp.

My framing is different.  My framing is that the private sector can manufacture its own ngdp.  It can do so by trade and it can do so by credit and of course velocity is endogenous to the available gains from trade.  Most of the major central banks are, today, not obsessed with snuffing out recovery and increases in real output.

The value of money can be defined in terms gold, other currencies, all goods and services, and share of NGDP that can be bought with a dollar.  These all involve an inverse relationship; 1/Pgold, or 1/price of foreign currency, or 1/price level, or 1/NGDP.  Thus NGDP can be viewed as a single thing (one way of describing the value of money), or of course it can also be viewed as a composite (P and Y, or M and V).  If someone is used to viewing policy in terms of money supply targeting, or price level targeting, then an NGDP discussion can seem odd—adding together two very different things.  As I said, if you target P (or M) then NGDP will seem to fluctuate due to “non-monetary factors” like supply shocks (or V shocks.)

But that tells us nothing about whether it is useful to think in terms of NGDP being causal, i.e. whether NGDPLT is a useful policy counterfactual.  So while Tyler’s argument is defensible, the average reader would probably assume that Tyler has spotted a logical error in the NGDP fanatics, which is actually not there.  (In fairness, elsewhere he explicitly denies doing so.)

Go back to the opening analogy in this post.  I favor eliminating moral hazard.  But it wouldn’t be fair of me to accuse someone who favored higher capital requirements for banks as having ignored the real cause of banking crisis.  At best I could argue my solution was more useful. Perhaps Tyler should have discussed which alternative monetary policy targets are the most useful.  The commenter who sent me this post thought (probably wrongly) that Tyler was criticizing NGDPLT.  I don’t see that.  He was claiming it’s not the cure-all some of its proponents seem to think it is.

To say “ngdp is low,” or “ngdp is on a low growth path,” or “ngdp is below trend,” and so on “” be very careful!  Those claims do not necessarily have causal force.  Arguably they are simply repeating, in a new and somewhat different language, the point that the private sector has not seen fit to engage in more trade, credit creation, velocity acceleration, and so on.  Formally speaking, the claims are not wrong, but I don’t find them useful as an explanation for why economic growth or recovery, at some point in time, is slow.  It is one way of repeating or re-expressing the slowness of economic growth, albeit with some transforms applied to the vocabulary of variables.

This paragraph touches on both the “causality” and the “usefulness” perspectives I discussed earlier, but in what seems to me to be a somewhat unsatisfactory fashion.  Start with the final two sentences.  He’s saying that by 2012 enough time had gone by so that wages and prices should have adjusted.  That’s an eminently plausible argument.  The final sentence can be thought of as an alternative hypothesis.  Say we are targeting P or M, and output is slowing for Great Stagnation reasons.  In that case NGDP will also slow (or might slow in the M targeting case) and MMs like me might wrongly attribute the slowdown in RGDP to a slowdown in NGDP.  And that’s certainly possible.

When Tyler wrote the post the most recent reported unemployment rate was 8.1%, for August 2012.  Now it’s 5.9%.  I believe the most useful explanation for that sharp fall is that NGDP has been rising faster than nominal wages in the US.  Tyler says central banks were not trying to snuff out the recovery.  But we do know that in 2011 the Fed was trying to speed up the recovery while the ECB was trying to reduce inflation by raising their target interest rate.  And we know that NGDP in 2011-13 grew much more slowly in the eurozone than the US.  And we know that unemployment rose sharply in the eurozone, while it fell sharply in the US.  So while Tyler is right that movements in NGDP need not have any causal effect on RGDP, I believe that it just so happens that we live in a universe where it does have a causal effect, or at least that it is useful to talk in terms of causal effects from NGDP.

This matters when we consider sticky nominal wages.  Sometimes it is suggested that the “inside workers” have frozen up or taken up so much ngdp with their sticky wage demands that the outsiders cannot find the ngdp to fuel their activities.  It’s as if there is not enough ngdp to go around, just as there was not enough clay to make a sufficiently large sculpture.

Yes, workers and firms can behave in a way that overcomes any shortages of NGDP. Indeed Tyler and I agree that in the long run they WILL behave in a way that overcomes any shortage of NGDP. But these metaphors are expressed in a slightly misleading way.  The average reader would have a great deal of trouble figuring out whether Tyler is expressing a new classical argument that nominal shocks don’t matter, and that real GDP is determined by real factors, or a NK/monetarist argument that nominal shocks matter in the short run but not the long run, and that September 2012 is now the long run, or the hybrid theory that nominal shocks might matter in the short run, but not if the short run NGDP changes are caused by real factors such as less aggregate supply.  A close reading of his other posts shows he believes the nominal shocks matter in the short run, but many of the (skeptical) NGDP metaphors employed here are also applicable to the short run.  Do they apply to a case where AS and AD are entangled?

So for instance, suppose a central bank is targeting inflation.  Then suppose an adverse supply shock reduces RGDP by two percent in the short run, even in the best of circumstances (i.e. stable NGDP).  But also suppose that NGDP falls with the supply shock (as Tyler correctly noted might happen.)  My claim is that in that case RGDP would fall by more than 2%, perhaps 4%. What does Tyler believe?  The metaphors he employs seem to suggest that he is skeptical of this claim, but elsewhere he argues that nominal shocks do matter in the short run, so falling NGDP should make the recession worse.

PS.  Two years ago I did a post in response to this same Tyler Cowen post.  I did this post without looking at my earlier post, and ended up with something very different.  Maybe in two more years I’ll do a third.

PPS.  I do agree with Tyler that framing effects are important.  In microeconomics there is one dominant framing method, and hence you don’t see as many cases of microeconomists who are Nobel Prize winners call each other idiots as you do in macro, where different framing effects lead to almost a complete failure of communication.

PPPS.  Election today?  All I care about are the referenda.  Both major parties have sharply declined in quality over the past 20 years.  Both deserve to lose.

Responding to John Becker

John Becker asked me this question:

Scott,

If the government massively cut spending and the economy boomed, do you think Paul Krugman would wave a white flag? If the Fed announced they were adopting NGDP level targeting and the markets tanked, would you admit defeat or start scrambling for other reasons why markets might react that way? I don’t think either of you would be wrong in either case, I’m just trying to make the point that economics theories are non-falsifiable by external events.

If the Fed announced a 5% NGDPLT and the markets tanked, then yes, I’d admit defeat.  I can’t speak for Krugman . . .

In fairness to Krugman, the proposed test of my theory is much more decisive.

If it were a 2% NGDPLT target I’d be much less confident, indeed I think markets might fall.

PS.  For some strange reason I like my new Econlog post, blaming Keynes and Hayek for the Great Recession.