Archive for August 2019

 
 

Scapegoat?

Here’s Bloomberg:

The markets have spoken. If they are to be believed, the potential for a U.S. recession has never been greater in the post-crisis era than it is right now.

That’s a problem for President Donald Trump because after the events of the past few days, it should be clear that he has effectively forfeited the ability to use the Federal Reserve as a scapegoat for any economic slowdown, an angle he was clearly prepared to play.

Think back to previous administrations that had to run for re-election during periods of high unemployment, such as Hoover, Carter, or the first Bush administration. How well do you think they would have done by pointing to the Fed?

I’m trying to imagine a bunch of unemployed steel workers in Ohio, sitting in a bar and commiserating over their plight. “You know, I’d like to blame the President, but it was not really his fault. Rather it was a tight money policy by the Federal Reserve that reduced aggregate demand and increased unemployment.”

Pretty funny, eh?

But it gets worse. Under Hoover and Carter, the onset of recession was actually associated with a high interest rate policy. If we have a recession in 2020 it will be trigger by a 2.4% interest rate policy. How many voters are going to blame the Fed?

I haven’t even gotten to the funny part yet:

“You know, I’d like to blame President Trump, but it was not really his fault. Rather it was a tight money policy instituted by key Federal Reserve officials such as Powell, Quarles and Clarida, people that Trump appointed to the Fed. So Trump himself is blameless for the insanely high 2.4% interest rates that clearly caused the recession.”

Yeah, that’ll work.

The article is correct that as of today Trump has no ability to scapegoat the Fed. The truth is that he never did.

PS. Three months ago I argued that pundits were underestimating the strength of China’s negotiating position in the trade war. Today, I see lots of other pundits jumping on board. If you want to read what the zeitgeist will be in three months, read the MoneyIllusion and Econlog today.

Here’s today’s FT:

Larry Kudlow, the top White House economic adviser, told CNBC on Tuesday that the Trump administration wanted to continue talks with China and suggested that the president could adopt a flexible approach on tariffs. Mr Trump on Friday said he would impose tariffs on another $300bn in Chinese products from September 1.

“The reality is we would like to negotiate,” Mr Kudlow told CNBC. “We’re planning for the Chinese team to come here in September. Things could change with respect to the tariffs.”

Hmmm, “things could change”.

Negative rates are a bad outcome

There’s nothing wrong with central banks paying negative interest rates on bank reserves. There is something very wrong with a monetary regime that causes equilibrium nominal interest rates to end up negative. That’s one way of thinking about my recent Econlog post.

Yahoo has an interesting article on negative interest rates:

“Rising life expectancy increases desired saving while new technologies are capital-saving and are becoming cheaper – and thus reduce ex ante demand for investment,” Fels writes. “The resulting savings glut tends to push the ‘natural’ rate of interest lower and lower.”

The disinflationary impact of technology is something that many economists and policymakers have argued is keeping a lid on inflation and, in turn, interest rates. Federal Reserve chair Jerome Powell, for instance, said in May that, “Today’s inflation dynamics are very different from even 25 years ago. Globalization and technology may be playing a role.”

These two paragraphs sound similar, but there are important differences.  Powell seems to be suggesting that globalization and technology reduce inflation by boosting aggregate supply.  That could happen, but in fact aggregate supply has done poorly in recent years, so there is no way that the supply side of the economy can explain the recent low rates of MEASURED inflation.  BTW, I don’t even consider this a debatable point; so don’t respond with irrelevant claims such as the theory that ACTUAL inflation may be lower than measured.

Fels’ comments are more interesting, albeit also wrong in an important way.  I suspect that he has correctly zeroed in on two of the key factors that are depressing real interest rates throughout the world. 

People often talk about “population growth”, but that clearly doesn’t explain inflation.  Venezuela may have the world’s lowest population growth at the moment, and last time I checked they were not experiencing deflation.  Fels is right that the aging population is more likely the key issue.  Middle-aged people now expect to live a long time, and they are willing to save money at even negative rates of interest:

Longer life expectancy, in Fels’ view, also contributes to lower inflation as longer-living savers have a “negative time preference,” meaning they prepare for future, rather than present, consumption. And all else equal, fewer people spending less money in the present will keep prices flat or falling as demand does not pressure supply.

“Once upon a time, economic theory maintained that people always value today’s consumption more than tomorrow’s consumption – and thus display positive time preference,” Fels writes.

“People would therefore always demand compensation in the form of a positive interest rate in order to forgo current consumption and save for the future instead. People were viewed as impatient, and the more impatient people are, the higher the interest rate has to be to make them save.”

But this is not the world we live in now.

He’s wrong about how this impacts “demand” (which is determined by monetary policy), but I suspect he’s right about the causes of ultra-low interest rates.

So if demographic trends causing more saving don’t lead to lowflation, what does?  The answer is simple: monetary policy.

So then why do low inflation rates correlated with low real interest rates and also with aging demographics?  That’s a harder question.

One possibility is that the correlation is explained by some central banks making the foolish decision to target interest rates.  Just look at the yen, where this is especially obvious.  Almost every time there’s a negative shock to the global economy that depresses the real interest rate, the yen appreciates and Japan falls further from its 2% inflation target.  The mainstream media claims this is due to people all over the world being engaged in a “flight to safety”, which doesn’t even pass the laugh test. Why would Japan be a safe haven? The yen even appreciates if the shock in question hits Japan itself:

Concerns about the impact of Japan’s earthquake and tsunami on the global economy intensified on Thursday as the yen surged and shares in Tokyo suffered further losses.

That’s right, mainstream economists would have you believe that a tsunami that destroyed out a big chuck of Japan’s industry, and that led to a shutdown of its nuclear power industry (supplying 30% of their electricity), led investors all over the world to seek a “safe haven” by putting their money into . . . Japan!?!?!?!?!

Yeah, that’s why the yen appreciated.

And notice that this surge of money seeking safety in Japan somehow failed to boost Japanese stock prices, which collapsed as the yen surged higher.

There’s a much simpler explanation. The Japanese central bank targets interest rates. When the equilibrium rate falls, monetary policy gets tighter and the yen appreciates. This has nothing to do with Japan being a “safe haven”.

Mainstream economists will tell you that Trump’s tariffs are inflationary. In fact, if they reduce the equilibrium interest rate and the Fed doesn’t respond appropriately, then the tariffs will be deflationary. Just as Smoot-Hawley was deflationary.

If you want to understand inflation, you need to understand monetary policy.

So what should the world do about negative interest rates? Set a NGDP level target at a high enough rate to push nominal rates above zero. There is no substitute. Japan tried massive fiscal stimulus in the 1990s and 2000s, and it completely failed.

The Fed is paying more attention to markets than they used to, but still nowhere near as much attention as they should. It’s depressing to see Fed officials discuss “long and variable lags”, which is 20th century thinking. Right now markets are telling us that monetary policy is too tight to hit the Fed’s inflation target. If they are worried about negative interest rates then they need to sharply cut their interest rate target, ASAP.

Rates are going to fall either way. It’s better they fall with an expansionary monetary policy than a contractionary monetary policy. Right now it looks like the latter.

The Treasury is lying

Scott Alexander correctly admonishes us not to overuse the term “liar”. Nonetheless, I can’t resist using that term here, as today’s Treasury decision seems so transparently dishonest:

The U.S. Treasury Department labeled China a currency manipulator Monday after Beijing pushed down the value of its yuan in a dramatic escalation of the trade conflict between the world’s two biggest economies.

The decision, which came hours after President Donald Trump accused China of unfairly devaluing its currency, marks a reversal for Treasury: In May, it had declined to sanction China for manipulating its currency.

The U.S. has not put China on the currency blacklist since 1994.

The Treasury has a very specific set of criteria for determining whether a country is a currency manipulator.  There is no question that China does not meet the Treasury’s definition.  Thus the Treasury is lying today in its claim that China is a currency manipulator.  Why?  Why would the Treasury lie?

Here’s my theory.  Trump ignored the advice of almost all his policy people in announcing another 10% tariff on China.  China retaliated by allowing their currency to depreciate, as currencies normally do in that situation.  Trump got angry and told Treasury Secretary Mnuchin to label China a currency manipulator.  Mnuchin said, “But Mr. President, China does not meet our definition of currency manipulation.”  Trump said he didn’t care, and ordered Mnuchin to lie about China’s currency policy.

Perhaps there is some other way to explain today’s announcement.  But until I hear a more plausible explanation, I’m going to assume that the Treasury is lying under orders from the President.

Almost every single day the US slides further and further toward banana republic status.  Today I heard some financial analysts suggests that we cannot believe what the Chinese government is saying about the trade war.  I thought to myself, “And you guys believe what the US government is saying?!?!?”

We should assume that everything we hear from the US government about China, about Iran, about North Korea, about Venezuela, etc., is a lie.  You say Huawei is a national security threat?  Show me the evidence.

PS.  Yes, this has always been a problem (Gulf of Tonkin, Iraq War, etc.), but the rot is spreading into even more areas than before.  It wasn’t this bad under Obama.  Treasury used to be a semi-respectable branch of the government.

PPS.  And it’s going to get worse:

Mr. Coats, a former senator and longtime pillar of the Republican establishment who angered the president by providing unwelcome assessments of Russia, North Korea and other matters, told Mr. Trump last week that it was time to move on, officials said. His departure removes one of the most prominent national security officials willing to contradict the president.

Solve for the equilibrium price of real estate

This caught my eye:

In the world’s biggest covered-bond market, a Danish bank says it’s now ready to sell 10-year mortgage-backed notes at a negative coupon for the first time.

Imagine a world where you didn’t pay interest on mortgage loans, rather the bank paid you interest to reward you for borrowing money from them.  How big a home would you buy? Yes, I understand that these are MBSs, not actual mortgages.

Still . . .

As Tyler Cowen might say, “Solve for the equilibrium price of real estate.”

Don’t look now, but monetary policy is tightening dramatically

While most of the economics profession seems to assume that a Fed cut in interest rates means money is getting easier, policy has dramatically tightened in recent weeks.

Perhaps the most startling data point is the expected level of interest rates in the fed funds futures market, which has plunged to barely over 1% in 2021. Consider that figure to be a prediction that NGDP growth in 2021 will be weak enough to justify such a low policy rate. Sorry, no more “one and done”.

Yes, it’s likely that the low expected rate partly reflects some factors unrelated to US NGDP growth, say global weakness, but I wouldn’t count on that explaining all of the drop.  Lots of other indicators also point to slowing growth in NGDP. Five year TIPS spreads are down to 1.41%, consistent with roughly 1.15% PCE inflation. Again, TIPS spreads are somewhat biased, but do contain at least some information about inflation expectations. Stocks are also selling off, albeit from a fairly high level.  While no single indicator is definitive, the overall picture is of a decline in aggregate demand (and aggregate supply as well.)  We are seeing the income and Fisher effects in action.

It’s now pretty clear that the Fed should have cut rates by 0.5% last week.  In fairness, the latest demand shock came from the renewed trade war, which occurred after the meeting.

The lesson here is that the Fed should adopt my proposal to adjust its fed funds target daily, to the closest basis point. Time to join the 21st century.

Update:  When the news starts to look like this:

 

It’s not a good sign. Oh, and Boris Johnson seems determined to drive the UK into a hard Brexit, while the Eurozone continues to be dysfunctional.

Have a nice day!