Archive for October 2013

 
 

How to tell if you understand monetary economics

There’s an easy way to tell whether or not you understand monetary economics. If you understand why all of the following seemingly contradictory sentences are true, and can clearly explain why using graphs showing the time path of interest rates and NGDP in response to both one-time changes in the monetary base, and permanent changes in the growth rate of the base, then you are all set.

1.  The bigger the monetary base, the more expansionary the monetary policy.

2.  The bigger the base/GDP ratio, the more contractionary the monetary policy.

3.  A move to a more expansionary monetary policy lowers short-term interest rates.

4.  In general, the higher the level of short-term rates, the more expansionary the monetary policy.

5.  The more expansionary the monetary policy the faster the growth in NGDP.

6.  The faster the growth in NGDP the more expansionary the monetary policy.

Many people, including pundits, policymakers and academics, never really grasp the intuition behind the seemingly contradictory statements 1 through 4.  They may understand them at some level, but have not internalized the concepts.

Statements 5 and 6 are not at all contradictory.  There is no puzzling paradox to wrestle with.  No conundrum. It’s simple, clear and straightforward.

One can argue that the Great Recession was largely caused by the general tendency to think of monetary policy in terms of money and interest rates, not NGDP growth.  Because these policy indicators are simply too confusing for the vast majority of influential pundits, policymakers and academics to work with, policy went tragically off course.

PS.  All of this was well understood long ago.  I studied these ideas in the 1970s. But they have never really been internalized, as Milton Friedman discovered in 1997.

PPS.  Nick Rowe gets it.

MOAR!

People keep asking me why we need to do more.  “Yes, monetary stimulus was needed back in 2009, but hasn’t the Fed done enough?  Don’t we need to return to normal?”  Yes, we need to return to normal NGDP growth, and normal interest rates, and you do that with a more expansionary monetary policy.

The concepts of “easy” and “tight” money only have meaning in reference the policy goal. We’ve been falling short of the policy goal since 2008, and we’re still falling short. That means we have tight money. Or perhaps I should say we have tight money unless you want to argue that 200% interest rates during hyperinflation shows that money is “tight” and that zero rates during the 1930s showed that money was “easy.”

What many people don’t grasp is that there is no such thing as “not using monetary policy.” A commenter recently noted that most progressives don’t favor using monetary policy because they see it as favoring the rich. I think that’s right, but it actually shows muddled thinking on two different levels. Progressives care a lot about inequality.  If they thought monetary policy was worsening inequality then they should care a lot about monetary policy. But it’s even worse; many progressives seem to think there’s such a thing as “not doing monetary policy.” Yes I suppose there is but only in the sense that there’s such a thing as not steering the ship, just letting the steering wheel float around at random.  But even that’s a policy decision, isn’t it?

And right now the ship is heading in the wrong direction, and needs more stimulus:

The era of easy money is shaping up to keep going into 2014.

The Bank of Canada’s dropping of language about the need for future interest-rate increases and today’s decisions by central banks in Norway, Sweden and the Philippines to leave their rates on hold unite them with counterparts in reinforcing rather than retracting loose monetary policy. The Federal Reserve delayed a pullback in asset purchases, while emerging markets from Hungary to Chile cut borrowing costs in the past two months.

“We are at the cusp of another round of global monetary easing,” said Joachim Fels, co-chief global economist at Morgan Stanley in London.

Policy makers are reacting to another cooling of global growth, led this time by weakening in developing nations while inflation and job growth remain stagnant in much of the industrial world.

Let’s suppose that after allowing nominal GDP to fall 9% below trend between mid-2008 in mid-2009, the Fed had started a new and lower trend line with 5% growth. That would’ve been an unconscionably contractionary monetary policy by any reasonable standard. That would’ve meant no trend reversion at all. And yet I believe that if they had done this unconscionably contractionary monetary policy beginning in mid-2009 the recession would now be over and the unemployment rate would have fallen to below 6%. Nominal hourly wages have done their job. Think about the fact that monetary policy has been much more contractionary than the unconscionably contractionary policy I just sketched out, and it’s getting increasingly contractionary as NGDP growth continues to slow.

So when will I stop asking for “MOAR”? When it’s no longer needed. But so far people like me and Lars Svensson have been consistently right and my critics, even inflation hawks that say the Fed should ignore unemployment and focus like a laser on 2% inflation, have been consistently wrong. Officials within the Fed and Riksbank and ECB have also been consistently wrong.  I see no reason to change my views as long as events continue confirming the validity of the market monetarist approach to policy.

BTW, one of the central banks that needs to do much more is the BOJ.  They are not going to hit their 2% inflation target in a sustained way (beyond sales tax distorted figures) without further yen depreciation.  On the plus side, inflation is a lousy target anyway.

PS.  My unemployment claim is based on NGDP in 2013 being about 4% higher, RGDP being about 3% higher, and unemployment being about 1.5% lower, or 5.7%.

PPS.  Off topic, but I just noticed that Paul Krugman provides one more good example of why the monetary base is the most useful definition of “money.”  When people talk about “dollars” going overseas, it’s really only the base that matters:

And even if the dollar loses some of its dominance, why should we get bent out of shape? There is no evidence that America is able to borrow dramatically more cheaply because of the dollar’s role (and anyway more foreign borrowing is not necessarily a good thing.) You often hear claims that we’ve only been able to run persistent trade deficits because of the special role of the dollar; this is just false, since other countries like Britain and Australia have been able to do the same thing.

What is true is that the large holdings of US currency outside the United States “” largely in the form of $100 bills, held for obvious reasons “” represent, in effect, a roughly $500 billion zero-interest loan to America. That’s nice, but even in normal times it’s only worth around $20 billion a year, or roughly 0.15 percent of GDP. And anyway, the euro has done well on that front too. If you like, South American drug lords hold dollars, Russian beeznessmen hold euros, and in both cases it’s a trivial subsidy to rich, huge economies.

The bottom line is that while saying “the international role of the dollar” sounds very sophisticated and important, the more you know about all this the less you care. This is simply not a big deal.

Singapore health care; what’s not to like?

Here’s Matt Yglesias describing the Singapore health care system:

“” “The first tier of protection is provided by heavy Government subsidies of up to 80% of the total bill in acute public hospital wards, which all Singaporeans can access.”

“” “The second tier of protection is provided by Medisave, a compulsory individual medical savings account scheme … Singaporeans and their employers contribute a part of the monthly wages into the account to save up for their future medical needs.”

“” As best I can tell, these Medisave accounts are deposited into the Central Provident Fund, a government-run investment pool, rather than constituting private savings as we would understand them.

“” “The third level of protection is provided by MediShield, a low cost catastrophic medical insurance scheme” supplemented if like by private insurance called Integrated Shield plans and “Singaporeans must subscribe to the basic MediShield product before they can purchase the add-on private Integrated Shield Plans.”

“” “Finally, Medifund is a medical endowment fund set up by the Government to act as the ultimate safety net for needy Singaporean patients who cannot afford to pay their medical bills despite heavy subsidies, Medisave and MediShield.”

None of this sounds to me like anything American conservatives favor.

Compared to America’s health care system, this sounds like utopia.  Let’s take them one at a time:

Tier 1:  The big problem in health care in America is inefficiency.  Part of that has to do with deciding what health care to provide, and what not to provide.  But everyone seems to agree that when people get into traffic accidents they need to be patched up.  Even the uninsured are often helped in ERs.  So “acute care” seems a no brainer.  I gather that Singapore provides this service at very low cost.  Their government spends only 1% or 2% of GDP on health care.  Conservatives love that.

Tier 2:  Medical savings accounts are loved by conservatives, because they put the market to work.  Most of my health care expenditures have been a complete waste, but I made them because I was on OPM.  I mean I was using Other People’s Money.  In Singapore I would have saved that money.  I wouldn’t care if they put my savings into a Sovereign Wealth Fund, as I have lots of other funds I can gamble with.  And there is the EMH.

Tier 3:  Conservatives love catastrophic health insurance.  Indeed we believe non-catastrophic health “insurance” is an oxymoron.  It’s prepaid health care.  Would you buy auto insurance for an oil change or tune up or new tires?  Then why buy insurance for things like maternity care?  Is having a kid a “disaster” that has to be insured against?” If you think so, you shouldn’t be a parent.

Tier 4:  Some conservatives oppose any form of redistribution.  But I love the fact that after the Singapore government has set up a streamlined health care system with the right incentives, they can take care of the truly needy at a trivial cost.  In America our government spends a massive amount on health care, and for all that money we still have 45 million uninsured.  For any pragmatic utilitarian conservative, the Singapore system is so much better than the American system it’s ridiculous.

BTW, they live longer than we do, and also longer than Europeans, although health care probably has little or no impact on life expectancy, at least at the margin.

PS.  Many conservatives undoubtedly disagree with me, and would hate the Singapore system.  There are actually conservatives who defend our system of “private” health insurance, even though it is nearly as statist as the Soviet economy circa 1980.  I’m not fooled, America has no truly free market sector for health care, although plastic surgery comes close.  So if we can’t have freedom, let’s at least have efficiency.

Asian stocks fall on fear of tapering, and fall again on expectations of non-tapering

File this one under “never reason from a price change”:

Asian markets fell Wednesday, with a stronger yen pulling Japanese stocks sharply lower, as the region reacted badly to a disappointing U.S. labor market report.

The September U.S. jobs report provided an unclear outlook for the world’s largest economy, increasing market expectations the Federal Reserve will keep its bond-buying program in place.

Fears of the Fed removing its easy-money policy resulted in a volatile summer for Asian markets, especially in Southeast Asia, and nonfarm payrolls were watched intensely as a possible forecast of the central bank’s intentions. The worse-than-expected jobs reading overnight reinforces the idea that stimulus will remain unchanged until next year.

Let’s clarify a few points.  It is true that fears of tapering raised long term bond yields last summer.  But it is not true that the more than 100 basis point run-up in bond yields was due to fear of tapering, as had been widely assumed in the financial press.  Bond yields are currently 2.5%, slightly lower than they were when tapering was expected, but far higher than a year ago, even though markets now expect an indefinite delay in tapering.  Most of the run-up in bond yields was due to factors unrelated to tapering fears. Perhaps stronger economic growth.  (Although I don’t see much evidence for that hypothesis either.)

So Asian markets fall on rumors of tapering, as tapering is expected to lead to higher interest rates and slower US growth.

And Asian markets fall on a weak employment report, as it portends slower US growth and lower interest rates.

What’s the common denominator?

IT’S THE GROWTH, STUPID.

PS.  Mark Sadowski and I are still discussing the Yi Wen paper from the St. Louis Fed.  I’m still struggling with the intuition behind the claim that a massive and permanent boost in the monetary base is not inflationary at the zero bound.  Is the liquidity trap expected to last forever?  If so, is that because the one time boost in the base is followed by a monetary policy that is tight enough to keep nominal rates at zero? Any help would be appreciated.

Nobody told me

Matt Yglesias has the following post:

Cato Institute Staging Gold Standard Love-In

Given the past five years of unusually low inflation and unusually low employment relative to the size of the population, the only sensible question to ask about monetary policy is whether the Federal Reserve has done enough to support aggregate demand and economic growth. Instead, the libertarian Cato Institute is sending out invitations to a November conference dedicated to talking about the gold standard:

I am presenting a paper at this conference and as you might expect I’ll advocate NGDP targeting.  I don’t plan any discussion of gold.  The Cato Institute has published one of my papers on the crisis, and I’ll do a comment over at “Cato Unbound” next month.  Many other classical liberal think tanks have asked me to contribute.  Still no invitations from progressive think tanks.  But then as Matt once said:

The Great Recession has revealed lack of capacity for engaging with monetary issues to be a major institutional weakness of the progressive movement.

On many issues the Dems are the party of bad ideas and the GOP is the party of no ideas.  On monetary policy it’s the reverse.