I beg you all to stop talking about German inflation
Everyone who reads blogs knows that a person’s IQ immediately drops by 15 points as soon as they start talking about politics. (Make that 20 if the post contains the word “lie.”) Something similar occurs with Germany and inflation. Here are the facts:
1. The German inflation rate should have no bearing on ECB policy, just as the Wisconsin inflation rate has no bearing on Fed policy.
2. If the German inflation rate were relevant to ECB policy, then the ECB policy should be more expansionary because German inflation is below target.
3. Germans are not inflation-phobic because of the 1920-23 hyperinflation; almost no one alive today remembers the hyperinflation. On the other hand a few very old Germans do recall how the deflation of 1929-33 put Hitler in power. The Swiss people (who are mostly ethnic Germans) did not have a hyperinflation and are equally inflation-phobic. It’s an ethnic German thing, not a 1920 memory.
There’s no longer a deutschmark, and thus German inflation doesn’t matter. If inflation mattered at all (it doesn’t, only NGDP growth matters), then the inflation rate that mattered would be the eurozone inflation rate. The mere fact that the press discusses German inflation might lead some Germans to believe there is an issue there, that they have some sort of debatable point to make. Not so, the German views on inflation are completely insane, with no shred of rationality, no redeeming logic at all. So let’s stop talking about the subject as if there’s a valid issue at stake. When uncle Fred claims he’s Napoleon Bonaparte, you discuss whether to put him in an asylum, not whether he used the right strategy at Waterloo. So stop talking about German inflation.
On the other hand the Germans are completely right about their fiscal policy and CA surplus, and the rest of the world is crazy.
PS. Tyler Cowen has a new post that criticizes the Summers-Krugman argument on negative real interest rates:
I cannot, however, agree with the central arguments about negative real interest rates, and the necessity for negative natural rates of interest (there are a variety of interlocking claims here, so do read them for yourself. I am not sure any brief summary can quite reproduce the arguments, which are also not fully clear).
Because Tyler also linked to my recent post in the opening paragraph, some readers might assume we differed on real interest rates. We don’t–I agree that negative real interest rates on Treasury securities are not the issue. The Keynesians have it all wrong.
Tyler also suggests that the Summers-Krugman thesis supports his views on the Great Stagnation. I think there is some truth to that. I’ve certainly been supportive of the stagnation thesis. But I’d add that there is a big difference been stagnating productivity and high unemployment. I have argued that the current high unemployment rate reflects both demand deficiency and adverse shifts in AS due to things like extended unemployment compensation. As demand gradually recovers and unemployment compensation is cut back to a maximum of 26 weeks I expect unemployment to continue falling back to the natural rate.
I strongly disagree with this.
The velocity effect on currency balances, from inflation, just isn’t that strong. At persistent negative rates of return we are much more likely to see an interdependence of AS and AD and some kind of cascading collapse of both. Or maybe it is simply better to say the framework has broken down than to try to squeeze one’s own predictions out of that set up.
Zimbabwe shows that it’s dangerous to mix real and nominal factors when modeling GDP. (Or America in the 1970s if you want a more pertinent example.) The stagnation story is about real interest rates. Nominal rates can be as high as the Fed wants, and velocity is highly sensitive to changes in nominal rates. To summarize:
X factors -> RGDP stagnation -> low real interest rates
Tight money -> slow NGDP growth -> high unemployment and low nominal i-rates
Don’t mix them up.