Archive for December 2012

 
 

Woodford on the Fed’s new guidance

The Washington Post got these comments from Michael Woodford:

As I’ve discussed before, I think there are important advantages of clarifying the criteria that will determine likely future policy. Today’s statement provides important additional clarification of the conditions under which it will be appropriate to begin raising short-term interest rates, relative to the FOMC’s statements in September and October. Such clarification is particularly likely to help stimulate the economy when, as in this case, it indicates that the conditions required for policy tightening will not be reached as early as some might have expected on the basis of past Fed behavior.

The explicit thresholds mentioned today are not ones that will be reached as soon as a federal funds rate above 25 basis points would be dictated by a reaction function estimated on the basis of the FOMC’s pre-crisis decisions, and in that respect the announcement should change the forecasts of future Fed policy of at least some market participants.

A more explicit discussion should also reduce some of the considerable uncertainty about Fed policy that has resulted from the series of unprecedented actions taken over the past few years. While the quantitative thresholds announced are not the ones that I have advocated, they represent a substantial improvement upon the date-based approach to forward guidance that continued to be used in the September and October FOMC statements.

The statement also clarifies that the federal funds rate target will remain low even after the asset purchase program ends; this has the advantage of allowing that program to end without the FOMC having to fear that this would be taken as a signal that interest-rate increases are also imminent. While there are no plans to end the asset purchases soon, I think it is important that the FOMC not be boxed in to a continuation of asset purchases at the current rate for as many years as might be needed to reach the thresholds required to justify raising short-term interest rates.

Some people have wondered why the stock market reaction was so muted.  I think Woodford provides two reasons here.  The guidance wasn’t as aggressive as he would have liked, and it was already close to what the markets expected.  Woodford would have preferred something more aggressive, i.e. something that would lead to greater than 5% NGDP growth.  In my view this policy is probably expected to lead to 4% to 5% NGDP growth.

PS.  Also over at the WaPo, Brad Plumer has a good article about how there is increasing global momentum toward more monetary stimulus.

PPS.  Readers than are fluent in French might wish to take a look at this paper by market monetarist Nicolas Goetzmann.

And now the other shoe drops . . .

From the Financial Times:

Treasury Open To Carney Radicalism

The Treasury opened the door to a more aggressive monetary policy on Wednesday, as aides to the chancellor welcomed the next Bank of England governor’s radical views on stimulus measure for flagging economies.

In a speech on Monday, Mark Carney suggested setting targets for the overall size of the economy, or nominal gross domestic product, rather than inflation. While Treasury officials said there were currently “no plans” to ditch the BoE’s 2 per cent inflation target, a spokesman for George Osborne added that “there’s quite a lot of interest in what he has to say … It reaffirms the fact that he is the central banker of his generation.”

Mr Osborne’s aides added that the chancellor was well aware of Mr Carney’s views on inflation targeting when he was appointed.

Any move to nominal GDP targeting would require the BoE to embrace bolder stimulus measures, even at the cost of higher inflation. Under its current governor, Sir Mervyn King, the BoE has been dismissive of nominal GDP targeting, even though some senior bank officials are privately attracted to its simplicity.

Spencer Dale, BoE chief economist, softened his stance on Wednesday, saying no ideas should be ruled out. He maintained, however, that nominal GDP targeting risked letting “the economy overheat relative to what you otherwise would have done”.

Mr Osborne’s aides are concerned the chancellor’s deficit reduction targets have slipped because the economy is not growing fast enough.

There is also wider political support for a new approach. In June, Vince Cable, business secretary, called for more “innovative” monetary policy that would generate a “robust recovery in money spending and GDP“.

And then there is this story:

In an August interview for the BBC, Mark Carney was definitive about the Bank of England governorship. “So is that a ‘no’ or a ‘never'”? he was asked. The reply came: “It’s both”.

Public denials of interest were reinforced in private by Mr Carney and his aides. Such was the certainty that the question on Monday was how did “never” become “yes”.

That affirmative took Westminster and the City of London by surprise when Mr Osborne announced that the Canadian would take over from Sir Mervyn King at the British central bank, in preference to an array of domestic candidates, with a mission to shake up the bank as it assumes sweeping new powers.

Announcing the appointment of the first foreigner to the post in the BoE’s 318-year history, Mr Osborne told the House of Commons that the ex-Goldman Sachs banker was “quite simply the best, most experienced and most qualified person in the world to do the job.”

 .  .  .

But come the summer, Mr Osborne was a disappointed man. The Financial Times story in April, saying Mr Carney had been approached for the governor’s job, had forced the Canadian to issue ever more vehement denials. The Treasury believed them and was told “no” definitively, so officials believed.

They insist Mr Carney was not lying because his denials were true at the time.

Mr Carney had told UK officials he did not want the strings attached to the job: a central bank with an economy in severe difficulties; a salary much lower than he liked, the need to move his wife and four daughters to Britain, and the prospect of serving an eight-year term.

According to people who have spoken to him, personal issues had held him back from applying. “His wife is happy in Canada and his kids are all happy in school. Personal issues were looming quite large,” said one friend.

But for each problem raised by the Canadian, Mr Osborne found a solution, such was his desire to have an outsider with a reputation as a brilliant manager as well as policy maker.

Instead of Sir Mervyn King’s salary of £305,000, Mr Carney will receive £480,000 plus a 30 per cent pension contribution. He could serve only five years instead of the eight stipulated in law. And the BoE will also provide relocation and housing expenses, never cheap in central London, although the Treasury insists the BoE will not pay Mr Carney’s school fees.

The BoE’s flexibility with the relocation and housing allowances were a key swing factor. Though Mr Carney had previously earned banker’s pay levels while at Goldman Sachs, he has been relatively modestly remunerated at the Bank of Canada.

Once the deal was sufficiently sweetened and Mr Carney had joined the race, aides to the chancellor say the process moved very quickly in a successful attempt to avoid leaks.

So they got the best central banker in the world, and like his ideas to go for growth.  Does it seem likely that the Treasury will say no to NGDP targeting?

Is it possible that this might really happen?

Other comments from Britmouse, Nick Rowe, Marcus Nunes, Lars Christensen.

PS.  David Beckworth and Ramesh Ponnuru have an excellent new article on the fiscal cliff:

It could counteract the effects of the fiscal cliff, too. The Fed could best do this by explicitly adopting a nominal-spending target. The more credible that target, the less the Fed would have to do to reach it: Private-sector expectations of future spending powerfully influence current spending levels. Knowing that the Fed would do whatever it takes, including aggressive open market operations, to maintain steady nominal GDP growth would create confidence and more economic certainty for households and firms — regardless of whether the government was cutting spending. The effect should be to offset every dollar of reduced government spending by roughly a dollar of increased private spending.

The Fed cannot undo the effects of any bad policy Congress enacts: It can’t, for example, restore incentives to work, save, and invest if legislators stifle them. What the Fed does have the power to do is to keep the Keynesian nightmare from taking place. We might fall off the fiscal cliff and then go into a recession. But if we do, it will be because the Fed failed to do its duty.

Matt Yglesias on the Fed announcement

Here’s Matt Yglesias:

This is huge. With today’s policy announcement, the Federal Reserve’s Open Market Committee has stopped screwing around and started doing real expectations-based monetary easing.

The new policy is a version of the plan from Charles Evans that I wrote about in March. They’ve said that interest rates will remain low until unemployment falls below 6.5 percent or the inflation rate exceeds 2.5 percent. That is a softer and weaker form of monetary easing than Evans originally proposed, but apparently a meager inflation target is the price you have to pay politically to get this done.

I think it’s huge in an intellectual sense, but not in a policy sense.  The Fed had already committed to keep money easy well into the recovery.  This makes that promise more explicit.  Which is good.  But it’s still a long way from level targeting.  A Japanese-style zero percent NGDP growth path over the next 2 decades is fully consistent with this commitment.

At the other extreme some are claiming that the Fed has abandoned or weakened its 2% inflation target.  Not in the slightest.  The Fed has a dual mandate for low inflation (interpreted as 2%) and the highest possible sustainable employment (intepreted as roughly 5.6% unemployment.)  Under that sort of targeting regime it’s appropriate to drive inflation below 2% when the economy is in a boom, and above 2% when unemployment is high.  Their dual mandate policy framework calls for more than 2% inflation right now.  If they were not targeting above 2% inflation they would lose credibility, indeed they would be breaking the law.

Of course the critics do have a point; it’s dangerous to set a vague composite target constructed of inflation and unemployment, where the Fed reaction function is unclear.  Today they’ve made it a bit clearer, and they’ve made monetary policy a tad more stimulative.  But they still have a long way to go.

Mark Carney’s speech on NGDPLT was huge, or would be if enacted.

Take that, Cantillon effect fans

Hot off the wire, once again Fed stimulus raises interest rates and lowers bond prices:

Treasuries fell after the Federal Reserve said it will buy $45 billion a month of U.S. government debt, expanding its asset-purchase program while linking its main interest rate to unemployment and inflation.

Only the Fed can make the price of something fall by purchasing more of it.  Ironically, the Fed wants to lower long term interest rates.

But as Bob Dylan once said:

there’s no success like failure

Extremely Worthwhile Canadian Initiative

JimP sent me a very interesting article from The Telegraph:

Mr Carney, the current Bank of Canada governor who takes over from Sir Mervyn King next June, said central bankers should consider committing to low interest rates until inflation and unemployment met “precise numerical thresholds”, or even changing “the policy framework itself” to stimulate a desperately weak economy.

His words were directed at the Bank of Canada but will be seen as a hint that he will push for radical action in the UK, where the economy has been stagnant for two years. On his appointment, he said that he would be going “where the challenges are greatest”.

Addressing the Chartered Financial Analyst Society in Toronto, Mr Carney said that in major slumps: “To achieve a better path for the economy over time, a central bank may need to commit credibly to maintaining highly accommodative policy even after the economy and, potentially, inflation picks up.

“To ‘tie its hands’, a central bank could publicly announce precise numerical thresholds for inflation and unemployment that must be met before reducing stimulus.”

He added: “If yet further stimulus were required, the policy framework itself would likely have to be changed. For example, adopting a nominal GDP level target could in many respects be more powerful than employing thresholds under flexible inflation targeting.”

The 3rd and 4th paragraphs hint at level targeting, but the 5th paragraph is the bombshell.  But first a little background.

On November 15, 2011, I testified (by video-conferencing) to a Canadian Parliament committee hearing on the subject of inflation targeting.  I advocated NGDP targeting.  Two representatives of the Bank of Canada were there; I believe one was Mark Carney.  Both opposed NGDP targeting, and favored flexible inflation targeting.  I should admit that like most Americans I knew nothing of Canadian monetary policy, which is why I can only say I believe Carney testified.  He was on the list of witnesses, but I did not know who he was at the time, and my memory for people is poor.  (For data it’s excellent.)

Carney was recently picked to head the Bank of England, so although the comments were made in Toronto and directed at the Canadian situation, they clearly have implications for Britain.

I think this also supports Matt Yglesias’s argument that to change central bank policy you must change the leadership (or at least the mandate.)  Leaders with a long tenure become very invested in current policy, and if a new policy is a great success, it suggests that the previous period of weakness was caused by the central bank’s previous caution.  I seem to recall he cited the Trichet–Draghi transition.

The very next sentence of The Telegraph article suggests that the current BOE chairman was unlikely to make that sort of switch.

The proposals would be anathema to Sir Mervyn, who has publicly refused to abandon the inflation target or commit to long-term low rates.

On the other hand the BOE still has an inflation mandate from the British government, so I don’t think we should take this as a sign the BOE will immediately switch to NGDP targeting.  But the Earth’s tectonic plates are slowly shifting.

This evening I had dinner with an individual who has excellent connections at the Fed.  He indicated that he knows for a fact that Bernanke is open to ideas such as NGDP targeting.  That doesn’t mean that he supports the idea, but rather that he sees merit in some of the “outside-the-box” thinking that is currently going on.  I’m sure that the recent experience with Fed policy has led Bernanke to see some advantages to the various reform ideas being kicked around, such as the ideas in Woodford’s Jackson Hole paper (which included NGDP targeting, among other ideas.)  Of course Bernanke’s official statements necessarily support whatever the Fed has decided to do at the most recent meeting.  This person also thought Bernanke was very well intentioned, an opinion I share.

PS.  Carney is now one of the 4 most important central bankers in the world.  This is a really big deal.