Now that’s price stability!

The Economist just published a piece that looks at the performance of quantitative easing (QE) in Japan from 2001 to 2006.  The article suggests that the policy failed, and provides extensive testimony from The Bank of Japan’s Governor, and one of its top economists.

THE Bank of Japan (BoJ) pioneered the process known as quantitative easing (QE) in 2001-06, when it massively boosted the reserves that commercial banks held at the central bank. Its verdict on how well QE worked then ought to interest policymakers today. It will also discomfort them. For all that it propped up Japan’s creaking banking system, QE did not really improve the economy nor end the country’s deflationary mindset (see chart).

Yes, by all means “see chart.”  In fact, take a very close look at the chart.  I don’t know about you, but to me that looks like perhaps the most successful monetary policy in all of world history.  Can you think of a central bank that did better?  So why is The Economist so pessimistic?  And for that matter why does Paul Krugman keep citing Japan as an example of why QE doesn’t work?  There are two reasons:

1.  Many people don’t realize that the Bank of Japan is not composed of a bunch of wimps.  When they say “price stability” is their goal, they mean price stability, not 2% inflation.  So when we evaluate the performance of the BOJ we have to judge them by the criteria they set.  How well did they achieve their goals?  At first glance that chart looks pretty bad, just as The Economist says.  The line zigzags all over.  But take a closer look.  QE didn’t start until about March 2001.  Prices had already been falling for quite some time, and QE did not immediately halt the deflation.  But this is the CPI we are talking about, which means it includes all sorts of sticky prices that adjust slowly to a weak economy.  And the Japanese economy was very weak in 2001.  But also notice that by the end of 2001 the CPI reached 98.  And then what?  As I read the graph the CPI stayed at 98, plus or minus about 0.7%, for the next six years.  I’d say that’s very stable prices.  The BOJ got what it wanted.  The chart shows QE being abandoned in 2006.  But isn’t it more accurate to say that QE wasn’t needed anymore?  The monetary base required for price stability fell sharply in 2006, and the BOJ responded by sharply reducing the monetary base.  QE is not just about increasing the base; it is also about decreasing the base when appropriate.  Even today, in late 2009, the CPI is still 98.  And way back in 1993?  It was 98.  Yes there was a two percent bubble in 2008, presumably due to oil prices, but is that really so bad?  Most modern inflation targeting proposals allow for some “flexibility” during supply shocks.  Most would say the flexibility in 2008 was exactly appropriate.  So tell me, why isn’t the BOJ performance since 2001 considered the best central bank performance in all of world history?  Can you find me a better 8 year stretch?  If price stability is the goal, I highly doubt it.  So why is this outcome viewed as being so disappointing?  One reason is that many in the West favor a positive inflation rate.  In fact I have been arguing that our current 1% inflation is too low.  But that’s not the point.  If one is going to judge the effectiveness of QE from a technical perspective, then it must be judged in terms of the BOJ’s goals, not the Fed or ECB’s goals.  And by their own standards they were brilliantly effective.

2.  Is that all there is to it?  No.  If you read the piece in The Economist they discuss all sorts of other problems in Japan.  But guess what?  All of the other problems discussed have absolutely nothing to do with the long run consequences of monetary policy.  In the long run monetary policy affects only nominal variables like inflation and NGDP, not real variables.  Notice how The Economist alludes to the slow growth in Japan during recent decades.  But is that really so surprising?   Their enviable export model maxed out in 1990.  Their population is falling.  Their service and agricultural sectors are hobbled by counterproductive regulations.  In short, their supply-side sucks.  So why wouldn’t you expect a fairly low trend rate of RGDP growth?  Banking problems?  What does that have to do with the long run trend rate of inflation?  If Japan had 3% inflation in the long run, how does that solve its structural problems?

You might be wondering whether I am serious, or I am being sarcastic.  A bit of both.  I am being completely serious that the Japanese case provides zero evidence that QE doesn’t work.  The BOJ got exactly what they aimed for.  Krugman has picked the worst possible example to criticize the effectiveness of QE.  I am a bit less certain about the wisdom of their policy goal.  Perhaps two percent inflation is a bit better if there is money illusion in the labor markets.  And unexpectedly low inflation rates might cause the debt overhang to persist for quite some time.  I recall that real estate prices in Japan have been falling for more than 15 years.  That is the “long run” by almost any definition.  So I suppose that they might have been better off with 1% or 2% CPI inflation, if it was up to me.  But it’s not my call.  The BOJ decided they wanted price stability, and they got it.  Oh boy did they ever!

HT:  Marcus.

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